To Err is Human: ART Mix-Ups - A Labor-Based, Relational Proposal by Bender, Leslie
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
College of Law - Faculty Scholarship College of Law 
2006 
To Err is Human: ART Mix-Ups - A Labor-Based, Relational 
Proposal 
Leslie Bender 
Syracuse University. College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/lawpub 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Iowa Journal of Race, Gender & Justice, Vol. 9, No. 3, Spring 2006 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at SURFACE. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in College of Law - Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, 
please contact surface@syr.edu. 
Bender, ART mix-ups  Draft: April 3, 2006  
 Page 1 of 189 
  “To Err is Human” 
  ART Mix-ups: A Labor-Based, Relational Proposal∗ 
  
 
Leslie Bender** 
 
 
Any human endeavor is prey to human error.  The consequences of human error 
in the area of assisted reproductive technologies are magnified by our playing in the field 
of creation of new human lives and lifelong relationships.  Stories of assisted 
reproductive technology (ART) mistakes continue to fascinate the media and popular 
culture, pain their multiple victims, and haunt the nightmares of ART participants, past, 
present, and future.  Though there are many kinds of mistakes that can arise in these 
complex processes, this Article focuses on mistakes or mix-ups involving the accidental 
use of incorrect gametes (sperm, ova, and embryos) during in vitro fertilization (IVF) 
procedures.1    
                                                 
∗© 2006, Leslie Bender.  All rights reserved. 
 
** Board of Advisors Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.  I am grateful for the hard 
work and thoughtfulness of the Journal student organizers of this conference, Professor Shelly Kurtz and 
his students who drafted the Model Act, and the other conference participants. Students in my Spring 2005 
Bioethics and Law class at Syracuse, attendees at my workshop at the 2005 National Women Law Students 
Association conference, and attendees at my Syracuse University Women’s Studies Program Faculty 
Speaker’s Series presentation  helped me refine my thinking on some of these issues.  I am lucky to have 
one of the country’s top experts in family and children’s law as my colleague and dear friend.  Sarah 
Ramsey unselfishly read through this Article for me on little notice and gave me valuable feedback.   My 
summer 2005 research assistant, Kenneth R. Miller, Class of 2006, helped me clean up this article as an 
added task to his already full summer schedule.  My 2005-6 research assistant, Liza Camellerie, Class of 
2006, also lent her talents to editing this article.   Dean Hannah Arterian and the Syracuse University 
College of Law supported this research with a generous summer grant.   
     I dedicate my continued writing on the children of ART mix-ups to my parents and to “all my children,” 
however they came to share their lives with mine: Benjamin Saller, Jola Hyjek, Todd England Nicodemus, 
Rachael Saller Bender, Jonathan Farmer, Nana Sang Bender, and Alida Sang Bender.   I am happy to say, 
neither I, nor any of my children, were the result of a reproductive mix-up, though my children came to my 
family by various routes.  My relationships with each and all of them inspire me to think about parentage 
issues differently than I would without having them in my life.  Despite their vital contributions to my 
understandings, I freely admit that many of them may not agree with my conclusions in this article. 
 
1 I use the term IVF broadly to encompass a range of procedures, including procedures involved in 
hyperstimulation of the ovaries and extraction of eggs, ex utero creation of embryos and transfer of 
embryos to a woman’s uterus or fallopian tubes (GIFT, ZIFT), intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), 
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Susan Buchweitz was accidentally given Robert and Denise B’s embryos during 
IVF.2  Donna Fasano was mistakenly given the Rogerses’ embryos in addition to her own 
during IVF.3  In other words, I am focusing on those mistakes where ova are mixed with 
sperm from the wrong man/donor, the wrong donated ova are mixed with the right sperm, 
or where one couple’s embryos are transferred or implanted into a wrong woman’s 
womb.  These mistakes lead to contests over who the parents are or should be, rather 
than, or in addition to, tort lawsuits for damages.    Though these mistakes may provide 
substantial recovery against the negligent fertility clinic and fertility doctors, those tort 
lawsuits are not the subject here.   This analysis does not include cases where there is 
criminal conduct, such as when fertility doctor Cecil Jacobson used his own sperm to 
inseminate 120 women,4 or when doctors at University of California, Irvine sold eggs and 
embryos without the progenitors’ knowledge to people in other countries.5  Nor does it 
include mistakes about the wrong sperm where there is no contest over parentage6 or 
when fertility clinics misrepresent their services and fail to adequately control gametes or 
                                                                                                                                                 
other drug treatment regimes to increase sperm motility, and the contemporaneous cryopreservation of the 
gametes or the subsequent cryopreservation of the embryos.  Although preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD) can be practiced on the embryo after creation and prior to implantation during in vitro fertilization, I 
am not including that process in the term IVF. 
 
2 Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 
3 Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).   
 
4 Unbeknownst to the many, many women that Cecil Jacobson artificially inseminated at his fertility clinic, 
he used his own sperm, rather than the sperm of anonymous donors as he represented.   For more about this 
situation, see Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, 
Sex, Race, & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 8  n.24 (2003) [hereinafter Bender]. 
 
5Stone v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 94 (Ct. App. 1999). See generally Aimee Welch, 
Special Report: When Scientists Kidnap Embryos, 16 INSIGHT MAG. 20, July 21, 2001; Judith D. Fischer, 
Misappropriation of Human Eggs and Embryos and the Tort of Conversion: A Relational View, 32 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 381 (1999). 
 
6 Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998) (involving a fertility clinic using sperm 
from a donor other than the one selected by the prospective parents). 
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embryos.7   Here I focus on which relationships between the ART-conceived child and 
the hopeful adults who engaged in the ART process will be recognized in law as parent-
child relationships. 
Of all the IVF procedures that occur everywhere each year,8 very few result in the 
kinds of horrific mistakes I discuss here.9  However, because of the generations-long 
consequences these mistakes cause, they could, without careful thinking, end up 
redefining families in ways not rooted in choice, but by happenstance, and sometimes 
even “force.”  Our legal system must find appropriate and just ways to resolve the 
disputes that arise from these mix-ups.  The solutions that the law applies must not 
unwittingly incorporate assumptions or hidden biases that do not inure to the benefit of 
the children and skew the resolutions in unjust, or even unpredictable, ways for the 
prospective parents.  ART-related mix-ups or mistakes ultimately ask us to consider what 
the relevant prerequisite(s) for assigning legally recognized parenthood are and what they 
should be—genetic contribution of gametes, gestational contribution, consent and 
contract, intent to create a child, intent to rear a child as its parent, existing or pre-existing 
relationships with the baby/child, the labor of rearing, the parents’ needs, the child’s best 
interests, social and emotional parenting, economic support, legal adoption, or something 
                                                 
7 Itskov v. N.Y. Fertility Inst., Inc., 782 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2004); Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (involving a fertility clinic that  used improperly screened sperm, 
resulting in a child with a serious genetic disability). 
 
8 The Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technologies (SART) 
prepare an annual report of nearly 400 fertility clinics’ success rates and numbers of ART cycles. Dept. of 
Health and Human Serv.: Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ARTReports.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2006).  For example, in 2003, the CDC 
reports that there were 112,872 cycles, resulting in 48,756 live births in 2003.  Dept. of Health and Human 
Serv.: Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003 Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Report: 
Section 1 -- Overview, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2003/section1.htm  (last visited  Apr. 3, 
2006).  
 
9 “Of all the gin joints in all the towns in all the world, she walks into mine,” says Humphrey Bogart in 
Casablanca.  CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942). 
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else.  They require us to examine this question from a justice, equality, relational, and 
humanist perspective.  They also ask us to examine the roles race and sex biases (and 
even economic privilege) play in distorting our legal conclusions about who is a parent. 
 I begin by telling some of the tales of woe that have occurred in this subcategory 
of ART mistakes involving gamete or embryo mix-ups.   In Part II I look at the proposed 
ART statute created by a group of University of Iowa College of Law students for a 
class.10  For those readers not particularly interested in an analysis of the model statute, 
that section can be skipped without consequences to my argument.  Part III briefly 
analyzes various courts’ approaches to the roles of contract, intention, the Uniform 
Parentage Act and other statutes, and genetics in assigning parenthood.    Part III focuses 
on recent cases only, in part because of the ever-evolving nature of parentage analysis in 
ART cases by courts.  While my core arguments are addressed to ART mix-ups, I test the 
application of reasoning from other recent ART cases on surrogacy (collaborative 
mothering), frozen embryos, assisted insemination, paternity presumptions, and child 
support rulings.  Hopefully these analogies do not lead us too far astray, because 
ultimately ART mix-ups are sui generis.  If I am successful, my analysis will discredit 
each of the approaches that courts and commentators have employed and plant the seeds 
from which I grow a “labor-based, relational” theory of parental rights and 
responsibilities for mix-up cases in Part IV.  This Article does not purport to be a 
comprehensive analysis of parentage cases, theories, and articles, but rather it is part of a 
                                                 
10 The Model Act created by the students served as the basis of the ensuing conference and symposium.  
Symposium, Creating Life? Examining the Legal, Ethical & Medical Issues of Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. (2005).   
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developing argument for choosing an alternative approach to resolving parentage disputes 
in cases of ART mix-ups. 
I. ART MISTAKE AND MIX-UP STORIES 
I offer this quick listing of reported ART mix-ups primarily to illustrate the range 
of problems that arise and the increasingly frequent rate at which these errors are 
reported.11   Many of these cases, though clearly not all, are discovered because of mix-
ups involving people of different races.  When parents give birth to children of races 
different from their own or from the characteristics of the promised gamete donors, the 
evidence of the mix-up is frequently clearer at birth to the participants and the 
reproductive clinic and/or hospital staff than when all the parents and the child are of the 
same race.   In other cases where race is not an issue, the mix-up may be discovered later 
because of the child’s physical attributes, personality traits, talents, genetic diseases, 
blood type, or because the fertility clinic informs the parties of the error.   
  For purposes of convenience, and perhaps for the effect of the argument, I will 
refer to race in the cases below as black and white, even though many of the children may 
be biracial and should be understood as such.12  Culturally, in the United States at least, 
                                                 
11 The increased frequency of reporting no doubt correlates with the increased frequency of use of the 
technologies, not with a greater percentage of incidents of errors. 
 
12 Use of the terms “black” and “white” does more than inappropriately absorb people who are bi- or multi-
racial.   It would no doubt be better to use dark-skinned or light-skinned, but that may add to confusion as 
well, since there are dark-skinned “whites” and light-skinned “blacks,” as well as dark-skinned peoples of 
South Asian and Pacific Island descent, for example. Pilar Ossorio & Troy Duster, Race and Genetics: 
Controversies in Biomedical, Behavioral, and Forensic Sciences, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 115, 118 (2005) (citing  
E.J. Parra et al., Color and Genomic Ancestry in Brazilians, 100 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI., 
USA, 177–82 (2003), and Mark D. Shriver, et al., Skin Pigmentation, Biogeographical Ancestry and 
Admixture Mapping, 112 HUM. GENETICS 387–99 (2003)).  Ah, the slipperiness of the concept of race and 
the “color-coding.”   In any case, the term black as I am using it here is able to serve as an umbrella for 
Americans, Caribbeans, Latinos, Africans, Asians, Pacific Islanders, Europeans, and Australians who 
exhibit dark skin; and the term white can be an umbrella for all of the same groups, who exhibit light skin, 
without requiring hyphenated terms, such as Italian-American, European-Latino, African-Caribbean, and 
German-African. 
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black and white have come to represent polar opposites on the continuum of race.  This is 
especially ironic since Professors  E.J. Parra, Mark D. Shriver, and R.A. Kittles, among 
others, have shown that a large percentage of African-Americans, for example, have at 
least one “white” forebearer,13 and who knows how many whites have black ancestors?14  
These mix-ups no doubt occur in other racial contexts, but I have not found any reported 
cases of Asian, Latino/a, or Indigenous peoples in these mix-ups.   Ironically, all the 
cases are presented in black and white, even in 2005.  I wish it would be that the answers 
were as legally and ethically “black and white,” but instead we find ourselves enveloped 
in shades of gray, or more appropriately, pinks and browns.   
Professor Cynthia Mabry reports the 1987 case of Julia Skolnick as the first 
known case of an ART mix-up.15  Ms. Skolnick, a white woman, wanted to achieve a 
pregnancy with her deceased husband’s frozen sperm.  When she gave birth, she had a 
“dark-skinned” (black?) child that was clearly the result of a sperm mix-up.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
13 E.J. Parra et al., Ancestral Proportions and Admixture Dynamics in Geographically Defined African 
Americans Living in South Carolina, 114 AM. J. OF PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY18, 25 (2000) [hereinafter 
Parra et al., Ancestral Proportions]; Parra et al., Estimating African American Admixture Proportions by 
Use of Population Specific Alleles, 63 AM. J. OF HUM. GENETICS 1839–51 (1998) [hereinafter Parra et al., 
Estimating];  Mark D. Shriver et al., supra note 11 (repeating the finding that European ancestry is 18.6% 
in African-Americans in Washington, D.C.); see also JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE:  MISCEGENATION 
AND MULATTOES IN THE UNITED STATES xiii (1995). 
 
14
 The Parra and Shriver research groups found that in a population of European Americans in State 
College, Pennsylvania, there was just under 5% admixture with African and Native American populations.  
Parra et al., Estimating., supra note 13;  Shriver et al., supra note 11  In some ways, the question in the text 
giving rise to this footnote is nonsensical, since modern science says all people alive today are children of 
people originally from Africa.  See generally JONATHAN MARKS, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE 98% 
CHIMPANZEE:  APES, PEOPLE, AND THEIR GENES (2002); JOSEPH L. GRAVES JR., THE EMPEROR'S NEW 
CLOTHES: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RACE AT THE MILLENNIUM (2001); MATT RIDLEY, NATURE VIA 
NURTURE : GENES, EXPERIENCE AND WHAT MAKES US HUMAN (2003).  
 
15 Cynthia R. Mabry,  “Who Is My Real Father?” – The Delicate Task of Identifying a Father and 
Parenting Children Created From an In Vitro Mix-Up, 18 NAT’L BLACK  L. J. 1, 60 (2004–05). 
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The first heavily media-reported case is the Stuarts, a white couple from Utrecht 
in the Netherlands, who in 1993 gave birth to twins, one white and one black.  It was 
determined that Mrs. Stuart was the victim of fertility clinic negligence.  One of her ova 
was fertilized by the sperm of a black Dutch Antilles man who was at the clinic at the 
same time trying to create a viable pregnancy through ART with his wife.16  Fortunately 
for the Stuarts, the genetic father of the black twin did not seek legal custody, and the 
Stuarts are raising the boys together as the brothers that they are.17 
In 1998 Donna Fasano gave birth to one white and one black twin when the 
embryo of a black couple (Deborah Perry-Rogers and Richard Rogers) was mistakenly 
implanted in her womb at a New York City fertility clinic (Central Park Medical 
Services). The black couple brought an action to get assigned exclusive parentage of the 
black twin.   A New York appellate court ruled that Mrs. Fasano, as well as her husband 
Robert, and even the other twin, were legal, biological strangers to the black twin to 
whom she gave birth.18  Fasano and her husband  also had their own genetic embryos 
created and the white twin was unquestionably considered “theirs.” The court interpreted 
the situation in a way that transformed the white mother’s role into a gestational surrogate 
for the black couple, even though she intended to bear and raise only her own children.  
The Rogerses and the Fasanos separately sued the fertility clinic.  The Fasanos settled 
                                                 
16 Geoff Marsh & Tony Brookes, We Had Black IVF Babies Too UK Couple Not First Whites to Get Wrong 
Children, Express Can Reveal, EXPRESS (UK),  July 9, 2002, at 6. 
 
17 For a recent NBC interview of the Stuart family, including the boys, by Ann Curry, see The Color of 
Love; Unidentical Dutch Twins Koen and Tuen Stuart’s unusual story of why one twin in black and the 
other white, Dateline NBC, 8 AM EST, NBC NEWS TRANSCRIPTS, Sept. 23, 2005. 
 
18 Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).     
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with the clinic early in the summer of 2004,19 and the Rogerses reached a settlement on 
the day of jury selection in September 2004.20   I wrote extensively on this ART mix-up 
case.21  
 In 2002 there was a publicized mix-up at St. George’s Healthcare Trust, south 
London, when the “‘good’ embryos from one woman were implanted in a second, and 
her [the second woman’s] embryos were then implanted in a third.”22  This fertility unit 
was later closed.   
In February 2003, a British court ruled that the husband in a white couple was not 
the legal father of black twins born to him and his wife after a sperm mix-up at the Leeds 
Hospital fertility clinic.23  Since the sperm of a black man, who was also at the clinic 
trying to conceive a child with his wife, had been mistakenly mixed with the ova of the 
woman from the white couple, the white woman and the black man were declared the 
twins’ legal parents.24  The opinion by Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss wisely granted 
custody and parental responsibility to the white couple, but, unfortunately, required the 
                                                 
19 Unwitting Surrogate Mom Settles Suit Against Clinic, KITCHENER RECORD (ONTARIO), July 2, 2004, at 
A8.  
 
20 Fasano v. Nash, 723 N.Y.S.2d 181 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Samuel Maull, Embryo mix-up lawsuit ends, 
THE RECORD (N.J.), Sept. 14, 2004, at A04, 2004 WL 59071305;  This case was settled with the physicians 
on the first day of jury selection. Embryo Mix-up Lawsuit Ends, N.J. REC., Sept. 4, 2004, at A4. 
 
21Bender, supra note 4 (criticizing the court’s decision in Perry-Rogers v. Fasano).  
 
22 Sarah Hall, Two Women Given Wrong Embryos in IVF Mix-up, THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 29, 2002, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,821239,00.html. 
 
23 Leeds Teaching Hosp. NHS Trust v. Mr. & Mrs. A & Others, [2003] EWHC 259 (QB). 
 
24 Clare Dyer, Judge backs adoption of IVF mix-up twins, THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 27, 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,903677,00.html; Sarah Lyall, Whites Have Black Twins in In-
Vitro Mix-Up, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2002, at A12.  Professor Mabry and Chantal Gill’ard have written 
extensively on this mix-up. Cynthia R. Mabry, supra note 15; Chantal Gill’ard, Law and Morality in 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Case Study on the Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust v Mr & Mrs A 
& Others, 4 J. PHIL. SCI. & L. (Aug. 12, 2004), available at www.psljournal.com/archives/. 
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white husband to adopt the twins in order to become their legal father.25   This case did 
not turn out as badly as it could have for the white couple, because the black father did 
not seek physical custody.  Nonetheless, he pursued legal paternity and visitation rights, 
which drastically disrupts their lives.26  Speculation is that this mix-up may have been the 
result of a dirty pipette.27  Because this case caused such an uproar a commission was 
appointed in 2002 to evaluate the IVF centers of the NHS trust.  Brian Toft, who spent 
two years investigating and writing a detailed, nearly 200-page report that was published 
in summer 2004, came up with more than 100 recommendations to reduce the likelihood 
of gamete mix-ups and other clinic errors in the future.28 
In June 2003 the California Court of Appeals for the Sixth Appellate District 
ruled about parentage in an embryo or sperm mix-up case.29  Robert B. and Denise B. 
contracted for some ova from an anonymous donor to combine with Robert’s sperm to 
later be implanted in Denise’s womb.  The clinic created thirteen embryos for them.  
Meanwhile, Susan B., an unrelated single woman, had embryos created at the same clinic 
                                                 
25  A v. B., [2003] EWHC 259 (QB). Had the clinic not made a mistake, the white husband would not have 
been required to adopt the children in order to be deemed their father. 
 
26 Id. 
 
27 These speculations are made in articles cited in note 24, supra.   A pipette is a glass tube used to select 
specific sperm for an insemination.  If a pipette is not properly cleaned before reuse, it could contain some 
residue sperm from a different donor.  
 
28 A government Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction, chaired by Suzi Leather, had Professor 
Brian Toft, a risk analyst, investigate errors at the nation’s fertility clinics after the facts of the Leeds clinic 
mix-up between Mr./Mrs. A and Mr./Mrs B was made public.  He found that there were twenty-two 
‘category A’ adverse events reported to the HFEA by British fertility units in the six months leading up to 
March 2004 and also announced other major errors at the fertility unit in Leeds, such as eleven eggs being 
inseminated with the wrong sperm and seven embryos being accidentally destroyed.  Mike Waites, Fertility 
Clinics Blasted for Failings, YORKSHIRE POST  June 22, 2004; see also Sarah Boseley, Secrecy blamed for 
fertility mix-ups, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 23, 2004, at 11; New IVF Bungles, THE SUN, June 23, 
2004; Beezy Marsh, ‘Shambles’ That Led to Blunders Over IVF Babies, DAILY MAIL (London),  June 23, 
2004;  Beezy Marsh, IVF mix-ups raise wrong baby fears, THE ADVERTISER,  June 24, 2004, at 43. 
 
29 Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).   
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for implantation in her own womb.  Susan B’s embryos were created from an anonymous 
ova donor and an anonymous sperm donor.  Susan B. specifically used anonymous 
donors to protect herself from any risks of paternity or parental claims by others.  Susan 
became pregnant from the implanted embryos and gave birth to Daniel B. in February 
2001.  Robert and Denise also achieved a successful pregnancy and gave birth to 
Madeline ten days later. But, the best laid plans in the ART universe can be foiled by 
human errors.   
 In December 2001, eighteen months after the mistake, and when Daniel was 
already eight months old, the fertility doctor told Susan that a mistake had occurred.30   
The clinic had accidentally implanted Susan B. with three of Robert and Denise B’s 
embryos.  Apparently the same ova donor was used for each couple and due to the 
mistake, Robert was the sperm donor for both births.  Therefore, Susan’s son Daniel is 
the full genetic sibling of Robert and Denise’s daughter Madeline.  As soon as they 
learned of the mistake, Robert and Denise sought contact with the boy.  Robert brought 
an action to declare his paternity and Denise to declare her maternity.  The appeals court 
affirmed the trial court’s finding that Robert B., a total stranger to Susan B., was the 
child’s father and granted him visitation. However, Denise was found to have no standing 
in any action involving this child, because she was not the ova donor nor the gestational 
carrier, and thus, a legal stranger.31  Susan B. (Buchweitz) went public with her story in 
August 2004,32 after she reached a one million dollar settlement with her fertility doctor, 
                                                 
30  Id. 
 
31  Id. 
 
32 Mary Anne Ostrom, Mom Speaks Out on Embryo Mix-Up, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,  Aug. 3, 2004, at 
2.   
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Dr. Katz.33  Despite the monetary settlement, Ms. Buchweitz’s problems continue as she 
and Robert battle over parentage, custody, and visitation in family court.34  Joan Ryan of 
the San Francisco Chronicle reports that a split custody agreement was mediated by a 
judge in March 2005.35  
 The dramatic publicity given to Ms. Buchweitz’s case prompted some west coast 
fertility centers specifically to reassure potential patients about the (im)possibility of such 
a mistake occurring during  IVF treatments at their center.36  In March 2005, Dr. Katz’s 
medical license was revoked.37  He had learned of the mistake ten minutes after it 
happened, but did not tell the parties until eighteen months later when he was threatened 
by a potential whistleblower.38  The Medical Board refused to entertain his appeal, even 
though many of his patients rallied to his side.39 
In August of 2003, a thirteen-year-old boy, who was the product of a 1988  
medically assisted insemination at a British fertility clinic north of London, finally got the 
proof he had been seeking:  he is not, in fact, the child of his purported father who is his 
                                                 
33 Chris Ayres, Mother Wins $1m for IVF Mix-up but may Lose Son, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 5, 2004. 
 
34 Id.  
 
35 Joan Ryan, Biology, technology in conflict, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 14, 2005, at B1. 
 
36 See, e.g., Pacific Fertility Center, Lab Mix-ups and PFC’s Approach, available at 
https://www.infertilitydoctor.com/fertilityflash/vol2_issue8.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2005). 
 
37 Mary Anne Ostrom, Fertility doctor's license revoked for misconduct, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut 
Creek, CA) Mar. 30, 2005, at f4. 
 
38 Id. The ethics debate that ensued about whether a fertility doctor who knows about a mistake 
immediately ought or ought not tell the parties is worthy of another article.  In part, Katz argued that if no 
one knew, everyone was better off.  Susan would have gotten what she wanted, Robert and Denise would 
have gotten what they wanted and there would have been no dispute over parentage to disrupt all their 
lives.  Mary Anne Ostrom, Doctor Recounts Embryo-Mistake Drama: Fertility Expert Says ‘Wrong 
Judgment’ Led Him to Deceive Two Preganat Women, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 13, 2005.  
 
39 Mary Ann Ostrom, California Medical Board Revokes License of San Francisco Doctor for Misconduct, 
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 30, 2005, at B. 
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mother’s former husband. His mother was supposed to have been inseminated with her 
husband’s sperm.  The parents were divorced when the boy was young, and the father 
went to court to get access to his son.  The boy felt he was very different from the man 
who was believed to be his father and wanted DNA tests done.  It took years and eighty 
hearings. Finally, a court ordered the DNA tests that proved there had been a sperm mix-
up at the clinic.40  Someone else is the boy’s biological father.  
In October 2003, Liverpool Women’s Hospital admitted that a group of 
ova/embryos had been exposed to sperm from the wrong men.41 
In June 2004 a jury awarded Kelly Chambliss $85,000 in compensatory and 
$350,000 in punitive damages against a fertility clinic that had inseminated her with the 
wrong sperm in 2002 in North Carolina.42  The fertility clinic challenged the award of 
punitive damages.  A North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled in March 2006 that 
“’sufficient evidence existed’ to support the award of punitive damages.”43 
In July 2004 Laura Howard, an African-American nurse from Trumbull, 
Connecticut, filed suit against her fertility doctor’s clinic/office for fertilizing her egg 
with the wrong person’s sperm.  Rather than her fiancé’s sperm, she was possibly  
impregnated with the sperm of one of two white couples who were also at the doctor’s 
                                                 
40 Angelique Chrisafis, Boy, 13, in IVF mix-up, wins six-year fight, THE GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 23, 
2003.  
 
41 Chris Ayres, Mother Wins $ 1M for IVF Mix-Up but May Lose Son, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 5, 2004, 
at 3. 
 
42 Cheryl Welch, Jury Awards $435,000 to Plaintiff, STAR NEWS (Wilmington, N.C.), June 29, 2004, at 1A. 
 
43 Cheryl Welch, Sperm-lawsuit award upheld; But attorney for clinic, nurse practitioner says they’ll 
appeal, STAR NEWS (Wilmington, NC), March 9, 2006, at 1A, 4A. 
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office that day.44  Although the doctor told her about the mistake almost immediately, she 
decided not to take the morning-after pill because she had been desperately trying to get 
pregnant for so long.45  She brought a lawsuit for, among other things, access to 
information about the possible sperm donor’s health.46    During her pregnancy, Ms. 
Howard’s fiancé, an African-American lawyer, declared his unwillingness to raise 
another man’s child.47  In January 2005 Ms. Howard gave birth to a healthy baby boy.48  
DNA testing that month revealed that her fiancé was, in fact, the father, to everyone’s 
relief.49   
 England is not the only part of Europe reporting these mix-ups.  In addition to the 
Leeds Hospital case of A. v. B., discussed above, in August 2004 there was a report of 
IVF errors giving women babies by the wrong men in Scotland.50  In September 2004, it 
became public that an Italian woman in a white couple gave birth to twins with dark skin 
following fertility treatment four years ago.  Three couples received treatment on the 
same day.  Recent DNA tests have confirmed that the biological father of the twins is a 
North African man. 51  This news came a few days after a newspaper reported that in 
                                                 
44 Experts Troubled by Case of Woman Who Says She was Given Wrong Sperm, WOMEN’S HEALTH 
WEEKLY,  Aug. 5, 2004, at 99. 
 
45 Daniel Tepper, Fertility Doctor Admits Mistake in Sperm Mix-Up, CONN. POST, July 15, 2004. 
 
46 Avi Salzman, Looking for Answers After a Mistake At the Start of Life, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2004, at 
14CN.  
 
47 Wrong Sperm Produces Baby, THE RECORD (N.J.), Jan. 12, 2005..  
 
48 Id. 
 
49 Rita Delfiner, ‘Wrong’ Sperm Right – Fiancé Is Real Dad After All, NEW YORK POST, Jan. 25, 2005, at 
25. 
 
50 Ian Johnston, IVF Errors Give Women Babies By Wrong Fathers, THE SCOTSMAN, Aug. 6, 2004, at 6. 
 
51 Sophie Arie, Italian IVF Blunder Fuels Fertility Law Row:  White Couple Seeks Damages after Alleged 
Egg Mix-Up, GUARDIAN FOREIGN PAGES, Sept. 7, 2004, at 14.   
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Turin, Italy, two couples were given the morning-after pill half an hour after one of the 
couples noticed that the sperm used had another man’s name on it. 52 
ART mix-ups will continue to happen.  Courts and legislatures must help the 
victims of these mistakes deal with the parentage issues.  Clear rules in advance of the 
mix-ups appear to be the best method to help, since they may reduce family court 
contested parentage battles. 
 
 II. PROPOSED MODEL ACT’S PROVISIONS REGARDING PARENTAGE 
 I commend the drafters of the Model ART Act (hereinafter Model Act) for the 
fine effort they made in producing their first public draft of this Act.53  They have 
conceived a statute that settles many areas of dispute that arise from the use of ARTs and 
collaborative reproduction (surrogacy).  Unfortunately, the proposed Model Act fails to 
address what is and will be the ever-growing category of children and parents whose 
legal relationships are confused by traumatizing fertility clinic and medical mix-ups.  
This Part will comment generally on what the Model Act does and does not do in cases of 
parentage and “future reproduction” disputes.  I urge the drafters of this Act, and 
legislatures in all states that may consider this Model Act, to revise some of the Act’s 
provisions in order to accommodate concerns raised in this Part.  I also urge inclusion of 
an additional, separate article specifically addressing issues of parentage in ART mix-
ups.  This proposed new article can supplement the Model Act, the Uniform Parentage 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
52 This Italian situation mirrors a case from 2002 at London’s St. George’s Hospital in which two women 
were given the wrong embryos during IVF procedures and required medical procedures to prevent 
pregnancies. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 
53 Sara Cotton, et al., MODEL ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY ACT, 9 J. GENDER, RACE & J. (2005) 
[hereinafter Model Act]. 
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Act (2000, revised 2002), or other laws regarding parentage that a state adopts.  Thoughts 
about framing the needed additional article are addressed in Part IV. 
 The Model Act borrows from, but ultimately substitutes for, the revised Uniform 
Parentage Act (UPA),54 which replaced the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted 
Conception Act55 and the original UPA.56  Unfortunately, states have been slow to adopt 
or utilize the revised Uniform Parentage Act.57  The absence of legislation continues to 
vex courts who are forced to decide disputes between parties engaging in ARTs, 
including disputes about legal, “natural” and biological parentage, inheritance rights, 
posthumous conception, custody and visitation, child support, collaborative reproduction 
contracts, surrogacy, and more.  Courts and commentators have repeatedly pled with 
legislatures to address these issues.58  The student drafters take us a long way towards 
                                                 
 
54 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2002), available at 
http://www.aaml.org/Articles/200011/UPA%20FINAL%20TEXT%20WITH%20COMMENTS%20.htm. 
 
55 UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/uscaca88.htm (last visited  Sept. 20, 2005).  
 
56UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/upa7390.htm  (last visited Sept. 20, 2005). 
 
57 The UPA (2000) has only been adopted in four states, although the 1973 version has been adopted in 
whole or in part in over fifteen.  Juli Ann Aylesworth, East vs. West: An Analysis of Connecticut and 
California Law Regarding Relationships Between Children and Those Who Function as Their Parents, 23 
QLR 1107 n.280 (2005).  The ABA House of Delegates approved the UPA at their mid-year meeting in 
February 2003.  Memorandum from Ernest Gelhorn & Judith Kaleta to Council, Section of Administration 
Law and Regulatory Practice (Feb. 21, 2003) (Report of the ABA Midyear Meeting), at 
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/spring2003/councilagenda/tab_3.doc (last visited Apr. 3, 2005). 
 
58In re C.K.G.173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005) 
(“Given the far-reaching, profoundly complex, and competing public policy 
consideration necessarily implicated by the present controversy [issue about maternity in 
case where couple had triplets using assisted reproductive technologies] we conclude that 
crafting a general rule to adjudicate all controversies so implicated is more appropriately 
accomplished by the Tennessee General Assembly… The General Assembly is better 
suited than the courts to gather data, to investigate issues not subject to current litigation, 
and to debate the competing values and the costs involved in such an issue as deciding 
whether generally to subject procreation via technological assistance to governmental 
oversight, and if so, to determine what kind of regulation to impose….Even courts which 
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solving many of these legal problems and make some marked improvements over the 
UPA, particularly in terms of gender-neutrality and accounting for nontraditional families 
of any sexes. 
The Model Act prefers that all aspects of reproductive technologies between 
gamete donors, prospective parents,59 and health care providers60 be governed by the 
parties’ consent and forethought, as memorialized in written contracts.61  This contract 
approach arguably may be the correct way to decide disputes that do not involve mix-ups.  
If a contractual approach is adopted in a particular jurisdiction, then these statutorily 
required, contractually binding provisions could become a powerful mechanism for 
                                                                                                                                                 
have crafted and applied the intent and genetic tests have been cognizant of the need for 
legislative action concerning technologically assisted human reproduction.” Id. at  . (See 
footnote 10, citing other courts’ calls for legislative action.) 
 
 J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 12, (Pa. Com. Pl. 2004) (“Unfortunately, H.B. 527 succumbed to the fate 
of several predecessors and died in judiciary committee …. Without an actual surrogacy statute in place, 
however, the court can only strongly urge the legislature to address the issues as soon as possible to prevent 
more complicated cases such as the one at bar.”); In re Parentage of A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126 (Ind. App. 2004) 
(“We encourage the Indiana legislature to help us address this current social reality by enacting laws to 
protect children who, through no choice of their own, find themselves born into unconventional familial 
settings.” Id. at 131). The Court in In re O.G. M. stated:  
This is a case of first impression without any statutory or precedential guidance. Because 
of the complexity of potential legal issues arising from the in vitro fertilization procedure, 
we will give deference to the Texas Legislature to enact legislation deciding the rights of 
parties involved in the in vitro fertilization process. 
988 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. App. 1999)  
 
See, e.g., Tim R. Schlesinger, Assisted Human Reproduction: Unsolved Issues in Parentage, Child Custody 
and Support, 61 J. Mo. Bar 22, 28 (2005) (“Thus far, every court that has been forced to deal with these 
issues has done so without guidance from the legislature.  Hopefully, the Missouri legislature can give its 
citizens the guidance they need to make intelligent decisions about having children through assisted 
reproductive technologies.”). 
 
59 Prospective parents are specifically defined in the Model Act at Article 1 (9):  
‘Prospective parent’ means an individual who intends to be a parent at the time an assisted 
reproductive technology contract is entered into and has not subsequently relinquished the 
control of the gamete or embryo.   
 
60 Including fertility clinics.  MODEL ACT, art. 4. 
 
61 MODEL ACT, art. 4, 5. 
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resolving certain kinds of ART disputes.62  However, in certain parts the Model Act does 
not live up to its promise of implementing ART participants’ intentions.  Those parts 
would have to be modified before a legislature adopts them.  
 Even if the preconception contract was completely valid and the consents were 
voluntary and informed, the Model Act provides a parentage “out” for all prospective 
parents63 and a reproductive “out” for most of the contract signatories who later change 
their minds prior to the introduction of gametes or embryos into the recipient.64  This 
serious defect in the Model Act undermines the emphasis on the parties’ intent as 
recorded in written contracts, even those contracts that anticipate the dispute at issue.  For 
example, the Model Act privileges genetic prospective parents over nongenetic 
prospective parents in the event of a dispute over embryos.65  I suggest that section 805 
be amended to eliminate the “get out of jail free card” for any prospective parent who 
signs a contract that contemplated the kind of dispute the parties are experiencing.  My 
critique is based on concerns about the Model Act’s making the “advanced directive” 
contractual promises illusory and violating its own asserted preference for implementing 
the parties’ intent.     
                                                 
62 See, e.g., Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002) (enforcing a written contractual preconception 
agreement about what to do with frozen embryos if the parties divorce and do not agree, even though the 
agreement no longer reflected the desires or preferences of either party). 
 
63 MODEL ACT, art. 4, § 403 (b): “A health care provider or a prospective parent may unilaterally revoke the 
assisted reproductive contract at any time prior to the introduction of gametes or embryos into the 
recipient.”  
 
64 I say “most” instead of “all,” because the Model Act, section 805(a)(1) does make the contract binding 
on both gamete-contributing prospective parents who anticipated the kind of dispute that arises and 
addressed the agreed-upon resolution in the contract, even if one of the parties later changes his or her mind 
prior to implantation of the embryo. 
 
65 MODEL ACT, § 805(2).  The Model Act also privileges self-donors of gametes because they have the 
statutory right to unilaterally revoke their consent to use of their gametes at any time and without regard to 
the contractual commitments.  Id. at § 804, comments to § 404.  
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Section 805 (a) of the Model Act declares that:  
 
{I]n the event any prospective parent provides a health care provider with 
notice in a record of a dispute between prospective parents concerning the 
disposition of embryos:   
(1) … the health care provider shall not permit the embryo to be gestated 
unless the dispute is resolved by agreement or death of one prospective 
parent;  
(2) if only one prospective parent contributed genetic material to the 
embryo, the parent contributing genetic material controls the disposition of 
the embryo; or  
(3) if neither prospective parent contributed genetic material to the 
embryo, the health care provider controls the disposition of the embryo. 66 
 
In subparagraph (2) of this section, the Model Act transforms otherwise 
enforceable and clear contractual agreements into unenforceable promises by giving a 
gamete donor a complete veto over use of the embryos for reproduction by the non-
genetic prospective parent, if that gamete donor changes his or her mind.67  Perhaps it is 
not surprising that students at the University of Iowa would craft a statute that reflects the 
sentiments of the Iowa Supreme Court as expressed in In re Marriage of Witten,68 that 
public policy would be violated if an agreement to procreate is enforced after one party 
has changed his/her mind.  
We think judicial decisions and statutes in Iowa reflect respect for the 
right of individuals to make family and reproductive decisions based on 
their current views and values.  They also reveal awareness that such 
decisions are highly emotional in nature and subject to a later change of 
heart.  For this reason, we think judicial enforcement of an agreement 
                                                 
66 MODEL ACT, § 805(a). 
 
67 Several recent commentators have criticized courts for making similar rulings on the grounds that 
revocability renders impotent frozen embryo use and disposition contracts.  See, e.g., Sara D. Petersen, 
Dealing with Cryopreserved Embryos Upon Divorce: A Contractual Approach Aimed at Preserving Party 
Expectations, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1065 (2003);  Fazila Issa, To Dispose or Not to Dispose: Questioning the 
Fate of Preembryos After a Divorce in J.B. v. M.B., 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1549 (2003); Nanette R. Elster, 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Contracts, Consents, and Controversies, 18 AM. J. OF FAM. L. 193 
(2005) (recommending that contracts be even clearer about controversial points so they can be enforced by 
courts). 
 
68 In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003). 
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between a couple regarding their future family and reproductive 
choices would be against the public policy of this state.69  
 
Several courts have done the same thing, giving gamete donors complete veto 
power over use of embryos if they change their mind, by relying on a public policy 
against forced reproduction and a constitutional right not to procreate.70  In a recent 
article extensively documented with social science literature, Ellen Waldman makes 
powerful arguments discrediting the courts’ reliance on “the myth of coerced 
parenthood” to prevent one prospective parent’s post-divorce use of frozen embryos 
created during the marriage.71  She argues that data, studies, and anecdotal experience 
show that many fathers who are no longer in a romantic relationship with the children’s 
mother and most sperm donors do not develop psychological, parental attachments to 
their biological children, so to give presumptive weight to the “myth of coerced 
                                                 
69Id. at 782.  
 
70 J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001) (“[S]ubject to the right of either party to change his or her 
mind about disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any stored embryo.”); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 
N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (“[P]rior agreements to enter into familial relationships (marriage or 
parenthood) should not be enforced against individuals who subsequently reconsider their decisions”); see 
also id. at 1056-57; Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) 
 
(“For the purposes of this litigation it is sufficient to note that, whatever its ultimate 
constitutional boundaries, the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights 
of equal significance—the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation. 
Undoubtedly, both are subject to protections and limitations. See, e.g., Prince v. Mass., 
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (finding that parental control over the education or health care of 
their children is subject to some limits); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that 
the states' interests in potential life overcome the right to avoid procreation by abortion in 
later states of pregnancy). 
 
The equivalence of and inherent tension between these two interests are nowhere more 
evident than in the context of in vitro fertilization. None of the concerns about a woman's 
bodily integrity that have previously precluded men from controlling abortion decisions 
is applicable here.”)  
 
These courts allude to the weighing of constitutionally protected rights to procreate and to not procreate, 
with the “right not to procreate” always being weightier. 
 
71 Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of “Coerced Parenthood” in Frozen Embryo 
Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1021 (2004). 
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parenthood” is misguided.72  She also challenges the courts’ claims that women who were 
intended parents of these frozen embryos have realistic options for reproductive 
alternatives.73   If contracts, as the written embodiments of the parties’ intentions going 
into the embryo creation and preservation processes, cover future events like dissolution 
of the relationship, yet do not equally bind the prospective parents in cases of such 
disputes, it is hard to understand the Model Act’s claim to promote prospective parents’ 
intentions above all else.  The New York Court of Appeals said as much in 1998 in Kass 
v. Kass: 
[It is] particularly important that courts seek to honor the parties’ 
expressions of choice, made before disputes erupt, with the parties’ 
over-all direction always uppermost in the analysis.  Knowing that 
advance agreements will be enforced underscores the seriousness and 
integrity of the consent process. Advance agreements as to disposition 
would have little purpose if they were enforceable only in the event the 
parties continued to agree.74    
 
It is not only the gamete donors who are given decisional authority to prevent 
reproductive use of the embryos.  If neither prospective parent is a gamete donor, but 
they have had created embryos with an initial intention of creating a child, a dispute over 
the embryos removes decision-making authority from the intended parents and grants it 
to a health care provider.75  This is true even if the contract terms contemplated the 
circumstances that gave rise to the dispute.  The comments to this section note that the 
                                                 
72 Id. at 1040–54. 
 
73 Id. at 1052–56. 
 
74 Kass v. Kass, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350, 696 N.E.2d. 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).   The most recent case on a frozen 
embryo dispute was decided by a Texas intermediate appellate court.  In Roman v. Roman, No. 01-04-
00541-CV, 2006 WL 304922 (Tex. App.-Hous., Feb. 9, 2006), the court resolves the dispute by resorting to 
the “clear” terms of the contract with the IVF clinic. 
 
75 MODEL ACT § 805(a)(3). 
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health care provider is statutorily permitted to give the embryos to an infertile prospective 
parent, but need not do so.76  In that case, the intention of the prospective parent who still 
desires to use the specially created embryo is slave to the health provider’s unbridled and 
liability-proof discretion.77  In essence this will often give one prospective parent, who 
changes his or her mind and creates a dispute over an embryo genetically unrelated to the 
couple, power to prevent the other party from achieving his/her contractually recorded 
intention to reproduce.   Why should the contract not bind both prospective parents, at 
least with respect to the option to reproduce, the raison d’être for the contract in the first 
place?  This provision is flawed in the same way and for the same reasons as the sections 
challenged in the previous paragraph. 
If the parties do not change their minds and continue with the reproductive 
processes as planned, the prospective parents who intend to become the parents of the 
child become the legal parents.78   This is absolutely the correct result.  People who 
intentionally create children should be their legal parents, regardless of genetics or 
divorce or later changes of heart.79   “Adults are in the position of making decisions to 
                                                 
76 Id. § 805 cmt. (3). 
 
77 Id. § 805(b). 
 
78 Id. § 801.  This is the same result that is dictated by the revised UPA (2000) (amended 2002), at least for 
fathers, in Article 7: 
SECTION 703. PATERNITY OF CHILD OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION.   
A man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a woman as 
provided in Section 704 with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the 
resulting child. 
The Model Act is an improvement upon the UPA section above because of its gender-neutrality.  This 
improvement permits lesbian co-parents , non-biological co-parents, and  single nongenetic, intending 
parents in gestational surrogacy contexts to consent to assisted reproductive technologies and thereby 
become legal parents. 
 
79 Accord, Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th  Supp. 1410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (finding nongenetic 
father and nongenetic mother of children born to a gestational mother to be the legal parents based on their 
intention to create the children). 
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create children and thus to create children’s dependency—decisions in which the children 
at issue can play no part.   Accordingly, it is appropriate to hold adults responsible for the 
children.”80   Elizabeth Bartholet further instructs that children have deep needs for 
nurturing and permanency, giving rise to concomitant duties or responsibilities of parents 
who created them to meet those needs.81   Whether or not the legal parents cohabit, the 
permanence of identifiable parents in lifetime relationships with children is essential.  
This Model Act, by automatically giving parental status to nonbiological, intentional 
parents once the child is born, prevents many of the grave injustices that have resulted 
from finding co-parenting partners of genetic progenitors to be legal strangers.82   
The Model Act is a significant improvement over some parts of the UPA.  It also 
has flaws that make some of its provisions contradict its overriding principle of enforcing 
preconceptual intent.  Before adopting this legislation or something similar, legislatures 
should make the changes recommended here. 
 
III. STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INADEQUACY IN ART MIX-UP CASES 
 The approaches in the proposed statute cannot be extended to mix-up cases, and 
the current approaches in the common law cannot be justly applied to mistake cases 
either.  This leaves a significant gap in law’s response to ART mix-ups.  Part III discusses 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
80 Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 323, 340 (2004). 
 
81 Id. at 337. 
 
82 Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d  785, 790 (Cal. App. Ct. 6th Dist. 2003), (finding Robert B’s 
wife, Denise, to be a legal stranger to the child born of the embryo that they together created); T.F. v. B.L., 
813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004) (finding that despite lesbian co-parents’ agreement to create a child using 
ARTs, the former domestic partner of the biological mother was a legal stranger and could not be required 
to provide child support). 
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the dominant approaches to parentage created through collaborative, assisted  
reproduction—contract, intent, UPA, and genetics—and explains why each fails to 
achieve justice in mistake cases. 
 A. Contract 
  Traditional contract notions obviously cannot be applied to mistake cases.  
Whatever contracts each of the progenitors or prospective parents had between or among 
themselves, those contracts are unlikely to successfully govern ART mix-ups where 
embryos, eggs or sperm are negligently implanted in the wrong uterus or gametes are 
negligently handled so that they are mistakenly given to the wrong parties.  Because the 
victims of these mistakes are unknown to each other, there can be no “meeting of the 
minds.”  There is no offer, acceptance, consideration, nor breach of promise.  To call 
victims of a clinic’s negligence third-party beneficiaries to the other couple/donor’s 
contract with the clinic makes a mockery of the concept.  Worse yet would be application 
of equitable doctrines such as unjust enrichment, that insinuate wrongdoing/injustice on 
the part of the “unjustly enriched” party.83   
Two possible ways that contract terms could be legislatively imposed to govern 
resolution of mix-up cases are a choice-of-options approach or a mandated result 
approach.  These contract terms, under either option, would have to be mandatory parts 
of clinic informed consent forms.  However, if the terms are mandated, it is harder to 
understand these clauses in terms of contract law rather than regulation.   
The Model Act could require health care providers to address the possibility of a 
mix-up in the consent forms that prospective parents must sign in order to participate in 
                                                 
83 How can victims of negligence become unjustly enriched?  At best their damages might be mitigated. 
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assisted reproductive technologies.   The consents could require prospective parents to 
select among proposed parentage options in the event of a mix-up or mistake.  
Theoretically, if the contractual alternatives selected by all parties to the mistake are, by 
some amazing coincidence, compatible, then the consents could control the resolution of 
any dispute (even if a party later changes his or her mind).   For example, the consent 
forms can include a subsection devoted to clinic mix-ups or uses of wrong gametes or 
embryos.  The consent form section can begin:  
As a prospective parent utilizing assisted reproductive technologies 
offered by this health care provider, I realize that despite a health care 
provider’s best efforts, mistakes are possible.  I acknowledge that 
through negligence, recklessness, intent, criminality, or some outside 
force, my gametes or the gametes I receive may not be used as planned.  
 
Then the consent provision can permit the prospective parent to check any of the 
appropriate options in subparagraphs 1 and 2: 
 1. In case I am mistakenly given the wrong gamete or wrong embryo: 
a. I do not ever want to be told about the mistake.  I want to continue 
the pregnancy and give birth to the child(ren), in accordance with 
the contract provisions, as if there had been no mistake. 
b. I want to be told about the mistake as soon as it is realized, but I 
want to be given the choice to continue the pregnancy or 
implantation, based on anonymous information about the mistaken 
gamete providers’ health and characteristics.  I do not want the 
mistake reported to the gamete donors at all.  
c. I want to be told about the mistake as soon as it is realized, but I 
only want to continue the pregnancy if the mistaken gamete donor 
will have no parental rights and make no legal claims to the child. 
d. I want to be told about the mistake and want an opportunity to 
discuss our options with the other parties to the mistake before I 
make a final decision about what to do. 
e. I want to be told about the mistake as soon as it is realized and I 
want to share custody and visitation with the gamete donors. 
f. I want to be told about the mistake as soon as it is realized and I 
want to terminate the pregnancy (even if one of the gametes was 
mine) or destroy the embryo if it was formed using my gametes. 
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g. I want to be told about the mistake as soon as it is realized and I 
want to carry the child to term, but relinquish all parental rights 
when the child is born. 
h. I do not want to be told about the mistake until after the 
child(ren)’s birth.  Then I would like to follow option 1 ( __ ) 
above. 
 
2. In case my gamete or embryo is mistakenly given to someone else: 
a. I do not ever want to be told about the mistake and do not want any 
relationship or responsibility for any child(ren) who may be born. 
b. I want to be told about the mistake as soon as it is realized, and I 
want sole legal custody of any resulting child(ren). 
c. I want to be told about the mistake as soon as it is realized, and I 
want visitation rights, but not custody, of any resulting child(ren). 
d. I want to be told of the mistake as soon as it is realized, and I want 
to be guaranteed that I will have no parental rights or 
responsibilities for the resulting child(ren). 
e. I want to be told of the mistake as soon as it is realized and to have 
no parental rights or responsibilities for the child(ren), but I want 
to be declared the parent on the birth records.  I agree to terminate 
my parental rights immediately after the birth is recorded. 
f. I want to be told of the mistake as soon as it is realized and to have 
no parental rights or responsibilities for the child(ren), but I want 
the resulting child(ren) to be told about me and how to reach me if 
they so desire. 
g. I want to be told about the mistake and want an opportunity to 
discuss it with the other parties to the mistake before I make a final 
decision about what to do. 
h. I want to be told about the mistake as soon as it is realized and I 
want the other party to terminate the pregnancy immediately.   
i. I do not want to be told about the mistake, even if it is not realized 
earlier, until after the birth of the child(ren).  Then I want to follow 
option 2 (__) above. 
 
Subparagraph 3 of this section should notify the prospective parent that the options 
selected by him/her are binding and irrevocable after a mistake has been made, unless the 
options selected by all the prospective parents victimized by the mix-up are not 
compatible.  In the event that the options are incompatible, the health care provider will 
immediately notify a court about the dilemma, and the court will have jurisdiction to 
resolve the dispute as quickly as possible.  Subparagraph 4 should make clear that a 
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prospective parent victimized by a mistake does not relinquish any right or remedy 
against the health care provider for harms caused by the mistake.  This choice-of-options 
alternative is excessively long, complex, and unlikely to succeed.  Its major virtue is that 
it appears to preserve the idea that the parties are able to choose what they want as part of 
their contract. 
 A mandated-result contractual approach, which does not allow for prospective 
parent choices of options, would require all consents and contracts with IVF clinics to 
contain a conspicuous clause (in a required large font and red ink) that clearly informs the 
signers about what exact terms they are agreeing to in the event of a gamete or embryo 
mix-up.  For example, the consent form could declare that: 
In the event of an embryo or gamete mix-up or mistake, the woman 
who gestates the embryo and gives birth to the child is the legal mother, 
and her partner, if any, is the other legal parent of the child.  The 
gamete donors do not have any parental rights or interests in the child 
and waive any rights to pursue actions for the declaration of parentage, 
custody or visitation.   
 
This mandated result clause, whether the result mandated is as proposed above or 
different, would be most effective if the law only deems the contract/consent valid when 
all the signers write out the clause in free hand and sign it specially.  A clear contract 
clause in the consents that each of the parties writes out manually can at least put the 
parties on notice about what will happen if there is an error. 
Each of these suggested contractual approaches requires tinkering and input from 
others, but they are examples of what might be possible if a legislature chooses to address 
ART mix-ups through laws governing contractual agreements and/or informed consents.  
The best reasons to employ this contractual methodology are that it forces prospective 
parents to contemplate the consequences of a mix-up before engaging in ARTs, and if the 
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options are made binding, as they should be, it indicates the parties’ intent while they are 
thinking most rationally, in advance of any mix-up.   Parties who cannot agree to these 
terms can opt out of the treatment process before the embryos are created or the gametes 
are provided, and in that way avoid any possible mix-up with its contractual, or 
consented-to consequences. 
On a more practical note, it is unlikely that health care providers will voluntarily 
use informed consent forms that raise contested issues of parentage in the event of a 
mistake or mix-up of gametes during the assisted reproduction.   No fertility clinic wants 
to highlight these relatively rare events.  Legislatures would have to require the inclusion 
of these contractual clauses in all fertility clinic informed consent forms.  In the choice-
of-options approach, it is even more unlikely that the consent forms signed by each of the 
prospective parents with an interest in the gametes or embryos will be completely 
compatible, so as to resolve the question of what the health care provider or a court 
should do in the event of a mix-up.   Nevertheless, this preliminary options list indicates a 
second method that a legislature hoping to maximize parental intent might employ, if it 
decides to offer a contract regime for resolving parentage disputes in cases of ART 
mistakes.    
Right-not-to-procreate and change-of-mind concerns that have convinced some 
courts not to enforce contracts in divorce-related frozen embryo disputes84 are not 
relevant, because in ART mix-up cases, a pregnancy is already in progress or has resulted 
in a child.   The only private party with the right to choose to procreate or not to procreate 
                                                 
84  A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); In re Marriage of 
Witten, 672 N.W. 2d 768 (Iowa 2003).  
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at that point in time is the pregnant woman.85  The reasoning in collaborative 
reproduction contract enforcement cases (surrogate contracts) brought against or by 
gestational or traditional mothers is not relevant either, because in collaborative 
mothering cases, the parties all intentionally created the situation in which they later 
found themselves. The parties made promises to one another that courts are being asked 
to enforce.86  In mix-up cases, the parties did not know each other, did not make promises 
to one another, and did not intentionally create the situation. 
B. Intent Standard 
 If the prospective parents do not reduce their intent to a written contractual form 
but still use a form of ART to create a child, many courts employ common law rules that 
define parentage by intent.  Use of an intent standard in cases of disputed parentage of 
children of ARTs is typically attributed to Professor Marjorie Schultz87 and the California 
court’s approach in Johnson v. Calvert, where “intent to parent” was deemed the decisive 
factor in selecting a single legal mother from two women with biological (gestational or 
genetic) connections to the child.88   In a later California case, In re Marriage of 
Buzzanca, “intent to parent” children created through ARTs was sufficient to find that a 
divorced couple were the legal parents of the children born to a commercial gestational  
mother, even though neither the man nor the woman in the couple was biologically 
                                                 
85 Planned Parenthood of S. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 
86 See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) (refusing to enforce a traditional surrogacy contract 
and instead applying adoption law to give mother time for reconsideration); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 
(N.J. 1988). 
 
87Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for 
Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297 (1990). 
 
88 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.1993).   
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related to the children.89  A growing body of case law has used “intent to parent” in cases 
of disputes about custody, visitation, or child support for children created by ARTs.90   
Mutual intent to create a child through ARTs and coparent (bring child into one’s 
home and assume the responsibilities of parenting) was a touchstone of recent state 
highest court decisions finding former domestic partners to be legal parents.91  In August 
2005 the California Supreme Court decided three companion cases about parentage 
disputes between former lesbian couples who had functioned as coparents of children 
they created using ARTs.92  Though the circumstances and reasoning of each case differ, 
and the decisions are each fact-specific, the Court seems to rely heavily on the parties’ 
mutual intent to conceive the child and to coparent.  For example, in K.M. v. E.G., a 
                                                 
89 In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. App. 1998) (stating that the children were created 
by the Buzzancas with anonymous donor gametes using a gestational mother). 
 
90 Interestingly, state intermediate appellate court uses of a common law intent standard relying on 
Johnson-type reasoning in 2004 were modified by state supreme courts in 2005 in various ways that were 
sensitive to the intent of the parties employing assisted reproductive technologies, but that relied on slightly 
different reasoning.   In re C.K.G., 173 S.W. 3d 714 (Tenn. 2005) (involving a dispute between a husband 
and wife over their triplets, in which the appeals court applied an intent standard to declare the wife who 
served as the triplets’ gestational mother to be their legal mother, despite her lack of genetic consanguinity, 
the father’s genetic connection, and his claim that his ex-wife was a biological stranger to the children. The 
Tennessee Supreme Court combined the “intent” reasoning, with reasoning about gestation as an important 
aspect of maternity and this case’s posture where there was not a competing claim of maternity, to decide 
that the gestational mother was the legal mother); In re Parentage of A.B., 837 N.E.2d 965 (Ind. 2005) 
(involving a dispute about parentage between biological mother and former lesbian domestic partner in 
which the appeals court applied an intent test, but the Indiana Supreme Court later reversed the reasoning, 
sending the case back to a lower court to apply a best interests of the child standard instead of intent to 
determine whether the lesbian coparent was a legal parent); McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (involving a dispute between gestational, non-genetic mother and her ex-husband, 
the genetic father, over custody of twins).  But see Maria B. v. Super. Ct., 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 494 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004), superceded  sub nom., Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 46  (Cal. 2005)  (Because of intent 
to create a child together using ART and bringing the children into her home to raise, a lesbian co-parent 
was declared a presumed. parent obligated to pay child support.  The appeals court used a common law 
approach but the California Supreme Court reached the same result, rooted in intent and conduct, based on 
its interpretation of the UPA). 
  
91 In re C.K.G., supra; In re L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005)(applying common law analysis to create a 
category of “de facto parent” for a nonbiological lesbian coparent in order to respond to a lesbian couple’s 
original mutual intent to create a child using ARTs and raise the child in their home). 
 
92 K.M. v. E.G., 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 (Cal. 2005); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 81 (Cal. 2005); Elisa 
B. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 46 (Cal. 2005). 
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lesbian couple who were registered as domestic partners used IVF with  K.M.’s ova and 
E.G.’s gestational mothering to create twins who were raised in their joint home until the 
couple separated.93  After their separation, E.G. argued that she had specifically agreed 
with K.M. before conception that K.M. would not be the children’s mother, but instead 
was an “ova donor.”  By applying a gender-neutral reading of the Uniform Parentage Act 
(UPA) sperm donor provision (which declares that sperm donors under certain conditions 
are not the legal fathers of the children resulting from use of their gametes), E.G. argued 
that K.M. had relinquished any parental rights claims as an ova donor.  K.M. saw things 
differently.  She petitioned to be declared one of the children’s two parents, arguing that 
the UPA provision about gamete donors did not apply and that under the Johnson intent 
test she should prevail.   Because the court specifically found that California law allows 
for two mothers in the companion Elisa B. case94 and that the Johnson intent test only 
applied “to break the tie” when there were competing, mutually exclusive claims for a 
single parenting role, 95 application of the Johnson intent rule was ruled to be 
inappropriate. The court relies on a different provision of the UPA instead of Johnson’s 
common law intent standard.  But, the California Supreme Court does not find the 
concept of “intent” irrelevant.   While not applying the Johnson intent test as the dissent 
urges,96 the court’s majority looks to the parties’ intent  “to produce children that would 
be raised in their joint home” as a tool to properly apply the UPA.  The majority 
                                                 
93 K.M. v. E.G., supra. 
 
94 Elisa B., supra note 92. 
 
95 Id.  The notion of the Johnson intent test being limited to breaking a tie between competing mothers 
originated in In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 893 (Cal. 1994). 
 
96 Id. (Werdegar, J. dissenting). 
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determines that E.G.’s gender-neutral reading and application of the UPA anonymous 
sperm (gamete?) donor provision is inappropriate because K.M. was not a gamete donor 
as contemplated by the statute, but a person who intended to raise the child.  In this way, 
“intent to parent” governs the interpretation of the statutory provision’s relevance. 
Ultimately the court applies a provision of the UPA defining maternity by either genetics 
or gestation, making both women the children’s mothers and obviating the need for the 
court to decide the matter through common law intent or creative statutory interpretation 
of a “presumptive mother” status.  The K.M. opinion is strewn with dicta about intent, 
both to address the parties’ arguments and to respond to the dissent.  Justice Moreno, 
writing for the majority, limits the “intent” aspect of its decision in one part (“It would be 
unwise to expand application of the Johnson intent test… beyond the circumstances 
presented in Johnson.  Usually, whether there is evidence of a parent and child 
relationship under the UPA does not depend upon the intent of the parent.”),97 while 
reinstating the concept of intent using the language of “understanding” in another part 
(“A woman who supplies ova to be used to impregnate her lesbian partner, with the 
understanding that the resulting child will be raised in their joint home, cannot waive her 
responsibility to support the child … [nor waive] her parental rights.”)98  To say that 
“intent” is no longer relevant would be to misread K.M. 
 This idea of intent to raise a child created through ARTs runs through K.M.’s 
companion cases, Elisa B. and Kristine H., as well.    In Elisa B. the county sued a  
lesbian partner for child support when her former domestic partner, the children’s 
                                                 
97 Id. at  
 
98 Id. at  (emphasis added) 
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biological mother, needed public assistance.  Elisa disclaimed fiscal responsibility for the 
children because she was neither the biological nor adoptive mother.  The Elisa B. court  
declares unequivocally that a child may have two mothers and that a nonbiological 
lesbian coparent can be a “presumed mother” under the UPA, even against her will.99  
The critical facts relied upon to impose parenthood status were the couple’s intent to 
create the children and raise them together. 
In the present action for child support filed by the El Dorado County 
District Attorney, we conclude that a woman who agreed to raise children 
with her lesbian partner, supported her partner's artificial insemination 
using an anonymous donor, and received the resulting twin children into 
her home and held them out as her own, is the children's parent under the 
Uniform Parentage Act and has an obligation to support them.100 
 
Though presumed mother status is created by a gender-neutral reading of the 
UPA’s section creating presumed father status, it is the intent of the parties in 
both situations that statutorily and interpretively govern parenthood , even (or 
maybe especially) when ARTs are used to create children101.   
                                                 
99 Elisa B. v. Superior Court, supra note 92. 
(We conclude, therefore, that Elisa is a presumed mother of the twins under section 7611, 
subdivision (d), because she received the children into her home and openly held them 
out as her natural children, and that this is not an appropriate action in which to rebut the 
presumption that Elisa is the twins' parent with proof that she is not the children's 
biological mother because she actively participated in causing the children to be 
conceived with the understanding that she would raise the children as her own together 
with the birth mother, she voluntarily accepted the rights and obligations of parenthood 
after the children were born, and there are no competing claims to her being the children's 
second parent. ) Id. at    . 
 
100 Id.  
 
101 Kristine H.,supra note 92, the third case in this California trilogy, was decided on grounds other than 
intent or the UPA specifically.  The court decided this case on the basis of estoppel because the parties 
jointly used the courts to get a pre-birth declaration of parentage for both lesbian partners, Kristine H and 
Lisa R..  Most states do not utilize pre-birth court stipulated judgments of parentage, and the court in this 
case repeatedly noted that it did  not decide whether these court declarations were valid, but the court did 
say that partners who go to court to get a declaration that a same-sex partner is a coparent are estopped 
from later denying that both same sex partners are parents.  This may be about the parties’ consent to the 
judgment, but it seems also to be about the parties’ intent, as represented by the judgment, that both parties 
would be the parents.  Impliedly, intent is again a foundation for determining parentage in an ART case. 
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In an en banc decision in November 2005, the Washington Supreme Court  
adopted a common law notion of “de facto” parent to fill in the legislative gap in 
statutory “parent” definitions.102  In re L.B. presents a claim by a former lesbian partner 
who coparented a child for six years with its biological mother, but was then denied 
visitation by the biological mother after the couple separated.  In affirming the reasoning 
of the appeals court and finding that the common law contains a notion of de facto parent, 
Justice Bridge explains the couple’s joint efforts to conceive and deliver the child as well 
as details of the many ways in which the couple expressed their intent and understanding 
that both women were L.B.’s parents.103  The criteria established by the Washington 
Supreme Court to determine if someone is a de facto parent include the natural and 
coparent’s consent/intent to the coparenting relationship and the coparent’s assumption of 
parenting responsibilities when she or he lived with the child.104  As with the California 
trilogy, the court in In re L.B. does not say specifically that it is applying an intent 
standard, but such a standard seems to undergird its reasoning on these facts.   Where 
same-sex couples jointly use ARTs to create a child that they intend to and do raise 
together, the nonbiological coparent in the couple is able to get legal standing as a “de 
facto” parent for purposes of visitation and custody in Washington and as a “presumed 
parent” in California.105   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
102 In re L.B., supra note 91. 
 
103 Id.  
 
104 Id. 
 
105 In re L.B., supra; Elisa B. v. Superior Ct., supra note 92.  
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While an intent standard or reliance on a couple’s intent to parent when creating a 
child through ARTs may perform adequately in assigning parentage in cases where there 
is an agreement that a specifically named and agreed upon woman will serve solely as a 
gestational mother for other “intending” parents or parent,106 or where a gestational 
mother with intent to rear the child is implanted with a donor egg or embryo,107 or where 
a domestic partner or spouse of a mother-to-be intends to co-parent the child-to-be,108 it 
fails miserably as a device for assigning parentage in cases of mix-ups.  A brief mention 
of a few of those cases in the next few paragraphs reveals the shortcomings of the intent 
standard in mistake cases.   
In the Fasano and Perry-Rogers example mentioned in Part I, both the Fasanos 
and the Rogerses went to the fertility clinic intending to create a child(ren) from their 
own gametes that they would rear themselves as parents.109  In fact, all the adults 
involved in this case had the same intent when they went to the clinic.  Donna Fasano did 
not intend to be a gestational (surrogate) mother for another couple, and the Rogerses did 
not intend to use a gestational mother to bring their embryos to life.  The Rogerses did 
not intend to donate an embryo to another couple, nor did the Fasanos intend to use a 
donated embryo.  None of the parties’ intents was implemented.  An intent analysis does 
                                                 
106 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 776. I have my doubts about the sole use of intent to determine maternity in this 
sort of case.   
 
107 McDonald, 608 N.Y.S. 2d at 477. 
 
108 In re L.B.; Elisa B.; Kristine H; In re C.K.G., all discussed supra in this section.  See also In re the 
Parentage of A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (Appeals court used agreement between lesbian 
couple – “intent” -- to declare former domestic partner a legal parent), vacated and remanded, King v. S.B., 
837 N.E.2d 965 (Ind. 2005)(Indiana Supreme Court vacated the appeals court’s conclusion that the parties’ 
agreement was determinative, but noted that Indiana courts have the power to award parental rights and 
responsibilities to a domestic partner if a trial court determines it is in the child’s best interest.).  
 
109 Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
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not aid in resolving the two couples’ and twins’ dilemmas. However, the appeals court in 
Perry-Rogers v. Fasano stated:  
Parenthetically, it is worth noting that even if the Fasanos had claimed 
the right to custody of the child, application of the “intent” analysis 
suggested in Professor Hill’s article, supra and employed in Johnson v. 
Calvert, supra, and McDonald v. McDonald, supra, would—in our 
view—require that custody be awarded to the Rogerses.  It was they 
who purposefully arranged for their genetic material to be taken and 
used in order to attempt to create their own child, whom they intended 
to rear.110 
 
This court’s application of an intent analysis to an embryo mix-up case seems 
clearly in error and presupposes the result that the court wanted to reach. 
 In the British A. v. B. case, both the As and Bs intended to use their own gametes 
to produce their own children that they would rear.111  Neither couple intended to produce 
children with another couple’s gametes, nor did they intend to serve or have another 
serve as a gestational mother for a child.  The mistake by the clinic confounded their 
intent.  Under these circumstances it is irresponsible of a court or legislature to rely on 
intent.    
 In contrast to those cases looking to intent, other courts have formally rejected 
intent as a source of legal parentage in ART cases, particularly where the court deems the 
parties’ intent either ambiguous or contrary to some public policy.  In Belsito v. Clark, a 
gestational surrogacy case, an Ohio Common Pleas court determined that intent was an 
                                                 
 
110 Id. at 24. 
 
111 A v. B, [2003] EWHC 259 (QB).   
 
Bender, ART mix-ups  Draft: April 3, 2006  
 Page 36 of 3689 
inappropriate measure of parentage. 112   The court defaulted to a genetics standard. 113  
The Ohio court rejected the intent test of Johnson for three reasons, among which is that: 
Intent can be difficult to prove. Even when the parties have a written 
agreement, disagreements as to intent can arise. In addition, in certain 
fact patterns when intent is clear, the Johnson test of intent to procreate 
and raise the child may bring about unacceptable results. As an 
example, who is the natural parent if both a nongenetic-providing 
surrogate and the female genetic provider agree that they both intend to 
procreate and raise the child? It is apparent that the Johnson test 
presents problems when applied. 114  
 
 In T.F. v. B.L., a contest between former lesbian partners who had lived together 
and decided together to have a child using assisted insemination, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court decides:  “‘Parenthood by contract’ is not the law in 
Massachusetts, and to the extent the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an 
agreement, express or implied, to coparent a child, that agreement is unenforceable.” 115   
Even in a case such as T.F. v. B.L., where the intent of the ART arrangement is not 
disputed, a state’s highest court would not let intent govern the allocation of parental 
rights and responsibilities.   In other words, undisputed intent to create a child and co-
parent a child created through ARTs was not determinative of legal parenthood or legally 
enforceable child support obligations.  Legislative adoption of the students’ Model Act 
would correct this sort of injustice.  Likewise, legislative adoption of the American Law 
                                                 
112 Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 766–67 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1994).  
 
113 An Ohio Court of Appeals decision recently applied the Belsito two-part test in a dispute between a 
commercial gestational mother and the genetic, ova donor mother (although really the genetic father was 
the instigator of the action) by first determining parentage by genetics and then examining whether the 
genetic parent waived or relinquished her parental rights.  Rice v. Flynn, 2005 WL 2140576 (Ohio App. 9 
Dist. 2005). 
 
114 Id. at 764–65. 
 
115 T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Mass. 2004).  
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Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, 
section 2.03 would recognize “parent by estoppel” and “de facto parent” in cases where 
co-parenting occurred by agreement at the behest of the biological or adoptive parent, 
regardless of sex, biological connection, or legal adoption by the co-parent.116  Still, the 
Model Act and the ALI Principles remain impotent to address mistake or mix-up cases. 
 Perhaps one of the most egregious examples of intent being undermined in a 
mistake case is Robert B. v. Susan B.117   Rather than relying on California’s intent 
analysis from Johnson v. Calvert, the court finds that the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) 
controls the case.118   
 C. Statutory Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) Provisions  
Although the California courts originated the “intent” test, they now seem to find 
it inapplicable in almost every ART parentage dispute that arises.119  Instead, they focus 
on expansive readings of the UPA.120  Returning to the Robert B. case mentioned at the 
end of the last subsection, the appellate court in that case insists that the language of the 
UPA is so clear that it is inappropriate to resort to statutory construction.121  Robert is not 
an anonymous sperm donor, by the statute’s definition, and therefore has not relinquished 
                                                 
116 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, AM. LAW INST. § 2.03 
(2002).  And, if the state does not legislatively adopt these recommended standards, courts have found 
those concepts in the common law.  In re L.B., supra note 91; In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 
(Wis. 1995).T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000). 
 
117 Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).  
 
118 Id. at 788.  
 
119 They may still apply the Johnson test in commercial collaborative mothering (or “surrogacy”) cases, but 
not in other ART cases. 
 
120 Although the California courts claim to reject the “intent to parent” analysis, I have argued above that 
intent is still a driving force in their interpretive analyses.   
 
121 Id. at 787. 
 
Bender, ART mix-ups  Draft: April 3, 2006  
 Page 38 of 3889 
his claim of paternity.  If Susan wants a different policy promoted by the statute, the court 
argues, she should make her plea to the legislature.122  Evidently that clarity evaded 
another California appellate court in the same district, when it concluded that the 
legislative policy protecting single mothers using ARTs for which Susan argued was 
already part of the same UPA section.123  Nonetheless, the UPA as drafted in either its 
1973 or 2000 version is not designed to resolve mix-up cases.   In Robert B., the court’s 
application of the UPA was really nothing more than a flawed intent analysis disguised as 
a statutory analysis. 
When Susan, as a single woman, went to the clinic to purchase ova and sperm 
anonymously, she made it clear that her intent was to raise the child as a single mother 
and to prevent any potential claims of paternity by a third party.124  She did not intend to 
be a gestational mother for another couple or a co-parent with anyone with parentage 
rights to her child.  Her intent was completely frustrated by the fertility doctor’s mistake 
and the court’s decision. The California appellate court indisputably ignored her intent to 
be unburdened by paternity claims in determining that Robert B. was Daniel’s legal 
father with visitation rights.  The court relied upon a section of the Uniform Parentage 
Act as enacted in the California Family Code, section 7613,125 but not in the way Susan 
interpreted it.  Susan read the act to grant legislative support to her intention to be a single 
mother, so long as she was inseminated by a licensed physician, which she was.  Rather 
                                                 
122 Id.  
 
123 Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (reinforcing the idea that the 
UPA policy is to provide single women with an option to avoid paternity claims, even with known donors, 
if they use a licensed physician). 
 
124 Robert B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786. 
 
125 CAL. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 7613(b) (West 2004).  
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than look to Susan’s actions and intent to inform its reading of the UPA, the court relied 
solely upon Robert’s.126   
The court emphasized that it was not Robert B.’s intent to donate sperm or create 
embryos for implantation in anyone but his wife.  Robert’s lack of intent justified not 
treating him as an anonymous sperm donor under the UPA, but for some reason Susan’s 
lack of intent to share parenting with another person did not justify treating her as a single 
woman who intentionally is an unmarried mother.  Instead, she became a co-parent or 
gestational mother under the Act.  Both Susan B.’s and Robert B.’s intents conflicted, the 
UPA arguably supported either, and the court arbitrarily selected one interpretation.  
Despite the court’s claim to be applying the clear meaning of the UPA, it was simply 
selecting one party’s intent over the other’s.  Thus, the UPA failed to resolve this ART 
mix-up case fairly. 
In addition, although her interests were inconsequential to the appellate court, 
Robert’s wife, Denise, entered into the ART process intending to be a child’s mother and 
nurturer.  She argued that “intent to parent” as accepted in Buzzanca established her 
claim to maternity.  A balanced application of an “intent to parent” analysis cannot work 
in this case because the clinic’s mistake left each prospective parent’s intent at cross-
purposes.  To favor one party’s intent over the others’ seems inherently unjust.  Yet 
Denise’s intent to parent and engage in the ART process, which was the same intent that 
rendered Mr. Buzzanca a parent (even against his later will), had no legal effect for 
Denise. According to the court, the UPA strips Denise of any parental connections 
                                                 
126 Robert B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789. 
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despite her having the same intent and commitment that Robert did.  As Chris Rock 
repeatedly bemoans in the movie, Head of State, “That ain’t right!”127 
The UPA analysis that undermined Susan B.’s desire to be a single mother 
without competing paternity claims and favored Robert B.’s parentage claim as the 
genetic father in the ART mix-up case worked well for K.M. in K.M. v. E.G.,128 a case 
where the ART procedure went as planned.  In both cases, the gamete donors were 
declared to be outside the gamete donor provision of the UPA that cuts off any parental 
rights or obligations.  Because the gamete donor provision did not apply to either Robert 
B. or K.M., they were entitled to claim parental rights based on genetic consanguity.  The 
construction of the UPA in K.M. seems correct because K.M. had the intent to parent and 
welcome the specific child created through ARTs into her home as her own child.  The 
parallel construction of the UPA gamete donor provision in Robert B. seems much more 
problematic, because in the mix-up case he had no intent to parent a child gestated by 
Susan B., they were not a couple who agreed to coparent the child in their home, and he 
had not done any parenting of the child prior to the judicial intervention.  At a minimum, 
when applying the UPA to ART cases that fall outside the anonymous gamete donor 
category, courts should follow the Elisa B. strategy of looking to the statute’s “presumed 
parent” provisions (the “presumed father” section becomes a “presumed parent” section 
                                                 
127 HEAD of STATE (Universal Studios 2003). 
 
128 K.M. v. E.G., 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 (Cal. 2005). 
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when read gender-neutrally),129 rather than reverting to the provision defining parentage 
by genetics,130 as the courts did in Robert B. and K.M.  
A different recent decision by a California appellate court seems to support Susan 
B.’s  interpretation of the UPA, by finding that the UPA specifically supports single 
women using ARTs to become mothers without the burden of paternity claims, although 
the case did not involve an ART mistake or mix-up.131    Perhaps there is a significant 
difference between cases of parentage disputes arising from ART mix-ups and cases of 
parentage disputes arising from the use of ARTs without mix-ups that justifies these two 
California appellate courts taking contradictory approaches.132  Perhaps not.  In Steven S. 
v. Deborah D.,133 a March 2005 decision by the California Second District Court of 
Appeals, the court found that Steven, the biological father, was solely a “semen donor” 
despite an intimate sexual relationship between him and the unmarried mother, despite 
the facts that the child bears Steven’s last name as his middle name, that Steven attended 
some doctor appointments with Deborah while she was pregnant and celebrated the 
                                                 
129 Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 46 (Cal. 2005). 
 
130 This argument for preferring the presumed parent provisions of the UPA to the gamete donor provisions 
when dealing with ART parentage disputes, particularly between same-sex parents, is made more fully 
infra.  That part of the argument must be delayed because this section of my argument relates to 
interpretations of the UPA gamete donor section. 
   
131 Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).  
 
132 While one might argue that a distinction between parentage disputes from ART mistakes and ART 
processes may be relevant, scholars have persuasively argued that a distinction between parentage disputes 
arising from parentage by sexual intercourse and parentage disputes arising from parentage by ART should 
be abolished.  See, e.g., Katherine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity 
Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 n.318 (2004) (proposing a model that 
“eliminates . . .  the distinction between ‘technologically produced’ children and  ‘regularly produced’ 
children”).  
 
133 Steven S., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 482.   
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child’s birth with Deborah, that the child calls Steven “Daddy Steve,” and that Deborah 
refers to Steve as the child’s father.  Judge Hastings reasons:  
‘Our Legislature has already spoken and has afforded to unmarried 
women a statutory right to bear children by artificial insemination (as 
well as a right of men to donate semen) without fear of a paternity 
claim, through provision of the semen to a licensed physician.’ The 
Legislature ‘has likewise provided men with a statutory vehicle for 
donating semen to married and unmarried women alike without fear of 
liability for child support.’134  
 
Deborah tried to get pregnant using a physician to medically inseminate her with 
Steven’s semen and through sexual intercourse with Steven.  Though Steven contends 
that Deborah became pregnant through sexual intercourse, the trial court specifically 
found that the child had been conceived through medically assisted insemination and not 
sexual intercourse.135   In Steven S. v. Deborah D., the semen that caused the pregnancy 
was administered by a licensed physician through assisted insemination, so under the 
UPA, the donor was not the child’s father and had no legal standing to bring actions for 
visitation or custody of the child.136  In this situation the statute, not the parties’ intent, 
controlled.   Had she been impregnated by sexual intercourse, even though the intents and 
understandings would have been the same, Steven would have had parental rights.  Being 
a known, rather than anonymous, sperm donor did not affect Steven’s rights under the 
court’s interpretation of the UPA.  Susan B. must wish that this court had decided her 
case or that her judges applied the UPA in this way that recognizes her right to remain a 
single mother without the threat of paternity claims. 
                                                 
134 Steven S., supra at 486 (quoting Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal.Rptr.3d 530). 
  
135 Id. at 484.  
 
136 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2004): “The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician and 
surgeon for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he 
were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”  
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The issue of paternity and standing to assert it by a known sperm donor under the 
Uniform Parentage Act also surfaces in a Texas Court of Appeals case, In re Sullivan.137   
In Sullivan, the biological mother and biological father entered into a co-parenting 
agreement prior to his donating semen for the purpose of donor insemination.  After 
conception, but before the child’s birth, the parties had a serious falling out.  The child 
was born on March 2, 2004 and on March 31, 2004, the man filed an action in trial court 
seeking to be adjudicated the child’s father, to establish a parent-child relationship, to get 
joint custody of the child, to order genetic tests, to prevent the mother from hiding the 
child or removing it from the area, for breach of contract, and more.138  The mother 
responded by challenging the man’s standing under UPA section 702: “A donor is not a 
parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”139  The man claims he 
has standing to maintain a parentage action under UPA section 602 as a “man whose 
paternity of the child is to be adjudicated.” 140   Dealing solely with the issue of standing 
to adjudicate paternity, Justice Kem Thompson Frost of the Texas appeals court in 
Houston decides that an unmarried man who donates semen to an unmarried woman has 
standing to seek an adjudication of parentage, even if he may ultimately be denied parent 
status under the Texas version of the UPA.141  Chief Justice Adele Hedges concurs 
specially to emphasize her understanding that the UPA provision denies parenthood to a 
                                                 
137 In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). The court never mentions in its opinion whether 
donor insemination was conducted by a licensed physician.   
 
138 Id. at 913.  
 
139 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (Vernon 2002). 
 
140 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §160.602(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). 
 
141 In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d at 911. 
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semen donor and hence would deny standing to the man in this case.142  However, she 
concludes that since the semen donor is also a signatory to a co-parenting agreement with 
the biological mother, it is through that instrument that he gains standing to adjudicate 
parentage.143  She buys into a “parentage by contract” model, which was roundly rejected 
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in T.F. v. B.L.144   Susan Buchweitz does 
not fare well under the Sullivan majority’s analysis.  She has a better chance of prevailing 
as a single mother in an ART mistake case under Justice Hedges’s interpretation of the 
UPA. 
  The UPA, if read gender neutrally, deals with both ova and  sperm donor 
parentage.  As mentioned earlier, the California Supreme Court, in K.M. v. E.G. in 2005, 
discussed the statute’s potential application to an ova donation situation.145  In that case 
the court unequivocally concludes that the gamete donor provision of the UPA applies to 
ova donors in the same way it applies to sperm donors, but finds that K.M. was not an 
ova donor under the statute because she intended to raise the child in her home at that 
time she provided the ova.146   
Again reading the UPA in a gender neutral fashion, the same court decided in the 
companion case of  Elisa B.,  that a different the provision of the UPA was relevant to 
determine parentage in a dispute involving lesbian coparents.  The court looked to the 
                                                 
142 Id. at 922 
 
143 Id. at 911.  
 
144 T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004). One cannot help but wonder whether the heterosexuality of 
the couple in Texas and the homosexuality of the couple in Massachusetts influenced the courts’ 
interpretations. 
 
145 K.M. v. E.G., supra note 92. 
 
146 Id. 
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section of the UPA that creates “presumptive paternity,” California Family Code, section 
7611.  By reading that section gender neutrally, the court finds that it creates presumptive 
parentage in a nonbiologically related lesbian co-parent who openly received a child 
created through ARTs into her home and held that child out as her own.147  Were the 
California courts that decided Robert B. and K.M., and even Steven S., to rely on a 
gender-neutral presumptive parent analysis, instead of a gender-neutral gamete donor 
analysis, the results in those cases would have been more consistent with the parties’ 
intended uses of ARTs and with the equities of the situation.  The California Supreme 
Court’s focus on different UPA provisions in K.M. and in Elisa B. may be attributable to 
the different kinds of parenthood claims being made.  In Elisa B., the same-sex coparent 
is denying her parenting responsibilities rather than seeking recognition of her parental 
status in the face of her coparent’s resistance.  In all the other cases discussed above, 
parties are asserting claims to parenthood status against the wishes of the gestating 
mother.  Even in cases where coparents are claiming parental status to a child created 
through ARTs against the gestating mother’s wishes, justice would be better served if 
courts and parties focus their arguments on the presumed parent section of the UPA (or 
rely on “de facto” parent arguments from the common law or ALI recommendations).   
The California Supreme Court and several California intermediate appellate 
courts have signaled in their recent ARTs-related parent cases that they will rely on 
interpretations of the UPA to resolve parentage disputes, unless the parties are estopped 
by their prior conduct from bringing their contested parentage claims to court.148   The 
                                                 
147 Elisa B. v. Superior Court, supra note 92.  
 
148 Kristine H. v. Lisa R., supra note 92 
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Washington Supreme Court was less sanguine about their state UPA’s application to 
same-sex couple parentage issues.  Application of the gamete donation section of the 
UPA confounds parentage questions in cases of children of ARTs, even where the 
procedures go as planned but the parties later disagree about parentage claims.  Since  
this UPA section is often ineffective in that simpler context of planned ART results, it 
necessarily is even more ineffective in resolving parentage disputes in cases of ART mix-
ups.  The most appropriate legislative response to resolving these parentage disputes is to 
supplement the UPA with an article devoted to ART mix-up situations, in the same way 
that an article addressing gestational surrogacy issues has supplemented the revised 
UPA.149 
D. Genetics 
 Some courts define legal parenthood by genetics in the first instance or by 
genetics when there is a conflict between parties, one of whom has a genetic relationship 
to the child and the other of whom does not.150    
[W]hat identifies a natural parent when a child is conceived by the use 
of in vitro fertilization and the surrogate who delivers the child 
provides none of the genetics of that child? The answer of this court is 
that the individuals who provide the genes of that child are the natural 
parents. However, this court further recognizes that a second query 
must be made to determine the legal parents, the individual or 
individuals who will raise the child. That question must be determined 
by the consent of the genetic parents. If the genetic providers have not 
waived their rights and have decided to raise the child, then they must 
be recognized as the natural and legal parents. By formulating the law 
in this manner, both tests, genetics and birth, are used in determining 
parentage. However, they are no longer equal. The birth test becomes 
subordinate and secondary to genetics.151 
                                                 
149 UPA, art. 8 (2000) (“Gestational Agreement”). 
 
150 Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 762–63 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1994).  
 
151 Id. at 767. 
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If both parties claiming legal parenthood have the intent to parent, then a genetics-based 
approach uses genetic-biological parenthood as the tie-breaker.152   
While claiming not to rely solely on genetics, the court in Perry-Rogers v. 
Fasano, an ART mix-up case mentioned earlier, necessarily relies on genetics to define 
the black child’s parents.153  Since there was no agreement (or contract) between the 
Rogerses and Fasanos for Mrs. Fasano to serve as a gestational surrogate, and since the 
Rogerses did not adopt the child, there was no legal basis, other than a default to genetics 
as the primary meaning of parenthood, to permit the court to find that the Rogerses are 
the child’s legal parents.  Other than understanding genetics as the singular test of natural 
and legal parenthood, there are also no grounds for the court to find that the Fasanos were 
legal strangers who could not even seek visitation rights to the child they gestated for 
nine months and to whom they then gave birth.   
Were the Perry-Rogers v. Fasano court not motivated to define parentage by 
genetics, it appropriately could have decided that Fasano was the legal mother because 
she gave birth to the child.  Absent a genetic trump card for defining parenthood, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
152  In Robert  B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 785 (Cal.Ct.App. 2003), the court uses the metaphor of a 
“tie-breaker,” a metaphor that I borrow here, although the Robert B. court uses “tie-breaker” for the exact 
opposite analysis.  I am arguing that genetics is the tie-breaker for some courts, like the Perry-Rogers court, 
where intent is tied; the Robert B. court, following the lead of the Moschetta court, argues that intent is the 
tie-breaker only where biology between two mothers is tied.  
      By reading Johnson’s intent test as only applying to ties between two biological mothers, the Robert B. 
court selects an unnecessarily crabbed reading of the Johnson v. Calvert case. The California Supreme 
Court in K.M. v. E.G., 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 (Cal. 2005), also reads Johnson narrowly, as applicable only to 
mutually exclusive, competing claims for a single parent position.  Johnson’s rationale should not be 
limited to a contest between biological mothers and has been applied in other kinds of ARTs situations.  
The gist of the Johnson rationale is that in a parentage contest arising out of a prior agreement between the 
disputants, the court should default to the parties’ intent at the time they entered into the ART-related 
agreement in order to select the legal parent.  
 
153 Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); Bender, supra note 4. 
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Rogerses are best understood as anonymous (or even known) embryo donors.  Whether 
the court sees the ART mix-up as causing “forced gestational surrogacy” or “forced 
embryo donation” depends entirely upon its pre-conceived biases.  There is nothing in the 
facts that makes one interpretation or image more legally valid than the other.154  But 
there is something in the law that makes one interpretation better—the principle of 
equality.   
In an earlier article I made the argument that equality demands the rejection of a 
genetics-based approach to parentage (at least for mix-up cases), because a genetics-
based approach is sex-biased, and may be race-biased in some contexts like the Perry-
Rogers v. Fasano case.155   Unfortunately, New York courts are powerfully wed to 
genetics-based analyses of parenthood, even at the expense of children’s needs to 
maintain relationships with the people whom they know as their parents.  New York 
appellate courts continue to declare co-parents, particularly in same-sex relationships or 
step-parent relationships, to be biological and legal strangers with no standing to seek 
visitation, even when that person was held out to the community as the child’s parent.156    
                                                 
154 I am reminded of those optical illusions where one view of the picture reveals an old woman in a 
headscarf, then a blink and another view shows a stylish young woman with her face turned away from the 
viewer.  Or the illusion where at first glance one sees a vase in the center of the image, and later one sees 
two silhouettes facing each other with the “vase” becoming blank space between them. 
 
155 See generally Bender, supra note 4. 
 
156 In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (refusing to recognize parenthood by 
estoppel or de facto parenthood and denying a lesbian co-parent standing to seek visitation, was decided 
with a strong dissent by Chief Justice Judith Kaye who argued that the court was hurting millions of 
children by “fixing biology as the key to visitation rights”); In re Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75 
(N.Y. 1987).  See also cases cited in footnote 158. Sean H. v. Leila H., 783 N.Y.S.2d 785, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2004) provides a recent example of a trial court following the same rules. (see text accompanying fn 162 
infra).     
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Donna Fasano, her husband and her son,157 in the mix-up case, as well as the co-parents 
in cases like those just mentioned,158 are designated “biological and legal strangers,” 
despite their substantial relationships with the children.   
Certainly a “biological and legal stranger” approach cannot be the best analysis or 
solution for this sort of parentage dispute.  It defies reality to claim that a woman who 
nurtured a child for nine months inside her body with all that that entails has no 
cognizable biological connection to the child.159  She may have no genetic connection, 
but genetics is not the all-encompassing exclusive definition of biological connection.  
Nothing is more biological than the entire process of pregnancy.160  The legal system 
loses credibility by making an assertion that a woman who gestates an embryo into a 
child has no biological or legal relationship to that child.161  Likewise, if anyone has ever 
seen newborn twins nestling together in an apparent attempt to reproduce some of the 
security and comfort they felt in the womb, she or he would know that there is a fierce 
biological connection between them, even if not a genetic one.   
                                                 
157 The child at issue in the Fasano case grew in utero with his “twin brother” for nine months, and 
thereafter spent four months with him, but the New York appellate court also determined that this 
“wombmate” was not a genetic sibling and therefore was a biological stranger with no legal rights to seek 
visitation.  See Perry-Rogers, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 24–27.  For an article stressing the importance of sibling 
relationships, see Ellen Marrus, Fostering Family Ties: The State as Maker and Breaker of Kinship 
Relationships, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 319 (2004). 
 
158 See also In re C.M. v. C.H., 789 N.Y.S.2d 393 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004); In re Janis C. v. Christine T., 742 
N.Y.S.2d 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); In re Multari v. Sorrell, 731 N.Y.S.2d 238 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); In 
re Lynda A.H. v. Diane T.O., 673 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
 
159 Similarly, it defies reality that a child nurtured for years in its home by a stepparent or same-sex co-
parent has no legally cognizable connection to that adult. 
 
160 That pregnancy is also emotional, intellectual, physical, and spiritual does not take away from the fact 
that it is a wholly biological process.  In fact, it is the one biological process that has kept our species 
present on this earth from our beginnings. 
 
161 McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), is the only case that finds 
differently in New York, but it does so based on intent, not biological ties. 
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The concept of a “biological and legal stranger” continues to be pernicious in 
New York law in disputed parentage cases, whether or not they involve ARTs.  A recent 
case is illustrative.  At the end of August 2004, Judge Diane Kiesel of the Supreme Court 
of New York, Bronx County, ruled that Sean H., a man who “held himself out to be the 
father to his wife’s child [for over five years], even though they both knew he was not[,]” 
was a biological, and therefore also a legal, stranger without standing to seek visitation 
with his little girl. 162   The court so found even though Sean (1) had married the child’s 
mother, Leila H., (2) had, in writing, officially acknowledged paternity, (3) had his name 
added to the birth certificate, and (4) the couple both held Sean out as the child’s father.   
After Sean and his wife Leila divorced, Leila married the little girl’s biological father, 
who had been absent for years and not a part of the child’s life.163  The court found that 
Sean H. has no standing to seek visitation, and that Leila is not equitably estopped from 
seeking to vacate Sean’s acknowledgment of paternity, despite holding Sean H. out as the 
child’s father for five years.164   New York’s appellate departments have rejected the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel and de facto parent to give standing to non-biological or 
non-adoptive parents in custody and visitation disputes ever since the In re Alison D. v. 
Virginia M. New York Court of Appeals decision.165   
                                                 
162 Sean H. v. Leila H., 783 N.Y.S.2d 785 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) . 
 
163 Herrera v. Herrera, Decision of Interest: Equitable Estoppel Does Not Confer Standing to Biological 
Stranger to Pursue Visitation, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 10, 2004, at 18. 
 
164 Unlike the New York court, the California Supreme Court did apply estoppel in a similar type, though 
same-sex, coparenting case in 2005.  Kristine H., supra note 92. 
 
165 In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).  The New York Court of Appeals said in In 
re Alison D: 
Petitioner concedes that she is not the child's "parent"; that is, she is not the biological 
mother of the child nor is she a legal parent by virtue of an adoption. Rather she claims to 
have acted as a "de facto" parent or that she should be viewed as a parent "by estoppel". 
Therefore, she claims she has standing to seek visitation rights. These claims, however, 
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Following the New York precedents, In re C.M. v. C.H declared that a former 
same-sex domestic partner was a legal and biological stranger to the second of two 
children she and her partner conceived during their eight-year union.166  Although the 
lesbian partner adopted the first child, the second child’s adoption was short-circuited by 
the couple’s separation and “divorce.”167  The court finds that without an adoption, the 
lesbian co-parent has no standing to seek visitation, even though she would be considered 
a “parent by estoppel ” of the younger child under the ALI Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution168 and many states’ more generous interpretations of their similar 
statutes.169   
A narrow genetic (or adoptive) definition of parenthood can obliterate existing 
parent-child relationships, as it does in this case.  One wonders how these courts can, in 
good conscience, be so insensitive to a child’s needs.170  Chief Justice Judith Kaye’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
are insufficient under section 70. Traditionally, in this State it is the child's mother and 
father who, assuming fitness, have the right to the care and custody of their child, even in 
situations where the nonparent has exercised some control over the child with the parents' 
consent . . . 
 We decline petitioner's invitation to read the term parent in section 70 to include 
categories of nonparents who have developed a relationship with a child or who have had 
prior relationships with a child's parents and who wish to continue visitation with the 
child (accord, Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal.App.3d 831, 279 Cal.Rptr. 212 [1st Dist., 
1991] ). While one may dispute in an individual case whether it would be beneficial to a 
child to have continued contact with a nonparent, the Legislature did not in section 70 
give such nonparent the opportunity to compel a fit parent to allow them to do so[.]Id. at 
29.  
 
166 In re C.M. v. C.H., 789 N.Y.S.2d 393 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) 
 
167 Id. at 364. 
 
168 American Law Institute, supra note 116 at § 2.03 
 
169 See, e.g., V.C. v. M.L.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999). 
 
170 Elizabeth Bartholet explains that children have powerful needs for permanence and consistency in who 
their parents are.  Bartholet, supra note 80. at 324. 
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words say it well, as she dissents from the In re Alison D. decision denying a lesbian co-
parent standing to seek visitation:  
[The decision today] may affect a wide spectrum of relationships--
including those of longtime heterosexual stepparents, "common-law" 
and nonheterosexual partners such as involved here, and even 
participants in scientific reproduction procedures. Estimates that more 
than 15.5 million children do not live with two biological parents, and 
that as many as 8 to 10 million children are born into families with a 
gay or lesbian parent, suggest just how widespread the impact may be. . 
. . [T]he impact of today's decision falls hardest on the children of those 
relationships, limiting their opportunity to maintain bonds that may be 
crucial to their development.171 
 
 New York courts are not alone in finding that genetics (or legal adoption) 
exclusively defines parenthood.  At least one other state supreme court has recently found 
that a mutual intention to create a child through ARTs and to co-parent the child, even 
accompanied by years of nurturing and raising the child together, will not suffice to give 
the nonbiological co-parent standing.172    
 On the opposite side of the coin are cases where genetic gamete donors donated 
under the condition that they would not have a relationship with the child, but were found 
to have one anyway.  In a recent Pennsylvania case, Ferguson v. McKiernan, an office 
co-worker served as a known sperm donor, when requested to do so by a married woman 
who was his former lover.173   The woman lied to everyone, including the fertility doctor 
who did the insemination.   She actually went to the insemination procedure with another 
man who she falsely passed off as her husband and the sperm donor, though he was 
neither.   Prior to and after the physician-assisted insemination, she assured her known 
                                                 
171 In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 30–31 (1991) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
 
172 T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004).  
  
173 Ferguson v. McKiernan, 855 A.2d 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).  I will spare the reader the rest of the 
sordid details of this story, as they defy imagination.  
 
Bender, ART mix-ups  Draft: April 3, 2006  
 Page 53 of 5389 
sperm donor that he would have no parenthood status or obligations.  Not citing to any  
UPA provision protecting a sperm donor when insemination is conducted by a licensed 
physician, the court found that a contract between parties to reproduce(and in this case 
allocate parental responsibilities for children created by ARTs) is unenforceable, because 
the parties cannot voluntarily “bargain[] away a legal right not held by either of them, . . . 
but belonging to the subject children . . . .”174  Despite acknowledging the woman’s 
“despicable” outright fraud and deception to all parties involved, and despite the use of a 
licensed physician to conduct the insemination, a Pennsylvania appellate court finds the 
coworker sperm donor to be the legal father of the child.175  The court reasons that since 
the marital presumption of paternity was rebutted by the woman’s husband, and since 
children are better off with fathers to help support them, the sperm donor’s genetic 
connection to the child makes him responsible for child support.176  
 In In re O.G.M., a Texas appellate court decides that a known sperm donor was 
the father, despite the fact that the parties were not married when the pregnancy began 
and according to the mother he had donated the gamete and waived all parental rights.177  
The Texas appellate court determines that the UPA does not apply because of the 
uniqueness of the situation.  In O.G.M. a frozen embryo that became the child was 
created during the marriage between the genetic mother (Mildred McGill Schmit) and the 
genetic father (Donald McGill).  However, it was not until three months after their 
divorce that Schmit conceived.   McGill accompanied Schmit to the IVF clinic at the time 
                                                 
174 Id. at 124. 
 
175 Id at 123–24.  
 
176 Id. 
 
177 In re O.G.M., 988 S.W.2d 473  (Tex. App. 1999). 
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of conception. Schmit claimed that McGill orally agreed to donate the embryo to her, but 
McGill claimed they agreed he would be the father.  Three months after O.G.M.’s birth 
McGill sued for paternity rights and Schmit objected.  Though the adults disagreed about 
what occurred, it seems odd that McGill would have divorced Schmit and then agreed to 
have another child with her as a coparent.  Schmit argued that the UPA controlled and 
prevented McGill from being declared the father, citing section 151.101(b): "If a woman 
is artificially inseminated, the resulting child is not the child of the donor unless he is the 
husband."178   McGill was not her husband, so he is not the father.  The court disagrees.  
It refuses to apply the UPA, saying that section 151.101(b) applies to artificial 
insemination and not in vitro fertilization with a subsequent implantation of a frozen 
embryo.179   Primarily because of McGill’s genetic connection, but also because of his 
acknowledgement of paternity and his asserted desire to parent, his claims to paternity 
overpower the parties’ prior agreement and reasonable interpretations of the UPA.   
In In re Thomas S. v. Robin Y.180 a known gay sperm donor is permitted to get an 
order of filiation, even though he made a preconception agreement with the lesbian 
couple donees that he would not be the child’s parent.  The court finds that his 
acknowledged biological/genetic relationship to the child, plus the couple’s post-birth 
conduct permitting the man occasional visitation with the child, makes the man the legal 
father, not a nonpaternal sperm donor.  Once the sperm donor is viewed as the father, the 
court decides it is required to apply due process standards for termination of parental 
                                                 
178  Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 151.101(b) (Vernon 1995).  These sections were deleted when Texas adopted 
the revised UPA in 2001. §§ 151.101 to 151.103. Deleted by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 821, § 2.13, eff. 
June 14, 2001.  V.T.C.A., Family Code, §151.101. 
   
179 In re O.G.M., 988 S.W.2d at 477.  
 
180 In re Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 356–57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
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rights, rather than look to the parties’ preconception agreement, in deciding whether to 
grant the filiation order.    Without the genetic trump card, this man would be no more 
than a friend of the family.  Because the court determines that the biological connection 
takes precedence over intent and the existing, stable two parent lesbian family, a known 
sperm donor is again granted parental status. 
Imagine if courts were so committed to genetic definitions of parenthood that they 
declared all formerly anonymous sperm donors to be legal fathers of the children they 
sired, at least for children of women who are or ended up being single mothers!    A 
theoretically consistent genetics-based analysis leads to this consequence.181  The other 
consequence of applying a genetics-based approach in ART cases is that real strangers 
(persons unknown to the child), like Robert B., are transformed into legal and biological 
fathers,182 while real fathers (persons who function as fathers and have a paternal bond 
with the child), like Robert Fasano, are transformed into legal and biological strangers.183 
Surely true parenthood is much more than biology.  However, even if for the 
moment we assume that courts, like the New York courts, Massachusetts’ highest court 
                                                 
181 Though not declaring them legal fathers, in some ways, Britain has moved in this direction with a new 
law it implemented in 2005.  The law gives children who are created from anonymous sperm donations 
after April 2005 the right to learn who their “father” is.  Sophie Goodchild, Agenda: This week’s big issues: 
secrecy to be lifted on donors, Children Born Through ‘Assisted Reproduction’ Will Get Right to Trace 
Biological Parents, INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY (UK), Mar. 27, 2005, at  29.  In the United States (so far at 
least), anonymous sperm donors are statutorily protected as non-fathers and declared to have no cognizable 
relationship to or responsibility for the child. See, e.g., UPA § 702 (2000).  Known donors often do not 
have the same kind of immunity from parenthood in the sperm donation setting.  But anonymous donors 
are protected.  Now, the new British law has brought waves of fear to the men who would anonymously 
donate sperm, resulting  in a steep decline in anonymous sperm donations.  The press reports that some 
ART clinics and participants are now forced to go out of Britain to purchase sperm.  Challenge to sperm 
bank law, DAILY RECORD (Glasgow, Scotland) Mar. 30, 2005, at 25.  
 
182 Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).  
  
183 Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
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in T.F. v. B.L.184 and Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center,185 and the Ohio 
Common Pleas Court in Belsito,186 or the Ohio Court of Appeals in Rice v. Flynn,187 are 
correct in using a biological approach to legal parenthood, a genetics-based approach is 
inappropriate.  The argument in this section is not that biology ought to be the only 
determinant of parenthood; rather, my argument is that when a court uses a biological 
definition of parenthood rooted in genetics, it uses biological parenthood in a sex-biased 
manner.  In an earlier article focusing on the Perry-Rogers v. Fasano case, I argued that 
genetics-based solutions to resolving parentage dilemmas arising from fertility clinic 
errors are fundamentally flawed and must be rejected.188  A genetics-based approach, by 
equating genetics and gametes with biological parenthood, but not equating pregnancy 
with biological parenthood, is sex-biased, promotes genetic essentialism, and in some 
cases, such as the Perry-Rogers case, can be race-biased as well.   I will not reprise my 
entire argument here, but a small portion of it is offered below and in Part IV to support 
my proposed labor-based theory of parenthood.   
A man’s biological contribution to reproduction is purely genetic.  His biological 
fatherhood is measured by the contribution of his gamete containing his complement of 
                                                 
 
184 T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004).    
 
185 Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133 ( Mass. 2001) (finding that the probate 
court has jurisdiction to enter pre-birth order that the names of the genetic gamete donors be listed as the 
parents on the children’s birth certificates, rather than the name of the contractual gestational mother);  See 
also J.R. v. Utah, 261 F.Supp.2d 1268 (D. Utah, 2002) (declaring that once gamete donor parents in a 
surrogacy case prove their genetic consanguinity, the presumption favoring parentage in the gestational 
mother dissolves). 
 
186 Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1994). 
 
187 Rice v. Flynn, 2005-Ohio-4667, 2005 WL 2140576 (Slip Opinion, Ohio App., 9 Dist. 2005). 
 
188 Bender, supra note 4.  
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the genes and chromosomes used in creating the embryo.  A woman’s contribution to 
biological maternity parallels a man’s contribution of a gamete and contains the other 
half of the child’s genetic and chromosomal complement.  A woman who contributes an 
ovum to reproduction makes the same kind of biological contribution (genetic) as a man 
does when he contributes sperm.189    Yet women necessarily contribute more to human 
reproduction.  Women also make a gestational contribution to reproduction, through 
pregnancy, intrauterine bonding, labor, delivery, lactation, and sometimes breastfeeding.  
In other words, men make only a genetic contribution to reproduction; women make a 
genetic contribution and a gestational contribution.  An analysis that defines parenthood 
by genetics takes into account all that men contribute, but only part of what women 
contribute.  In order to be just, an analysis must take into account all that each 
contributes.  The only way it makes sense to count all that men can do (genetics), and 
only that, as the sine qua non of parenthood, is if one begins the analysis with a male 
norm of what it means to be human.  But to be human is to be either female or male (or 
some combination of both).  A fair analysis of biological parenthood must include both 
genetics and gestation.  Katharine Baker agrees: 
As discussed, men simply cannot invest what women must invest in 
pregnancy, and what women must invest is huge.  Rewarding that 
investment with superior rights simply reflects a principle basic to the 
common law and to more recent trends in family law rewarding 
investment with rights.  Refusing to honor what is unquestionably a 
greater contribution smacks more of oppression than equality.  Thus, 
the reward that the proposed model offers to gestational mothers is not 
offered as a retreat from ideals of gender equality, but as an embrace of 
those ideals.  Only if we recognize and reward the labor that women 
                                                 
189 The work it takes to produce and extract multiple ova is significantly more intrusive and physically 
taxing than the work of providing sperm.  In a genetics approach, these two would be of comparable 
weight.  In a labor-based approach as I propose, infra Part IV, the extra labor provided by a woman gamete 
donor would be rewarded by a parentage priority. 
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have always done and, to a large extent, continue to do, can we expect a 
world of meaningful equality.190 
 
In cases like Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, a genetics-based analysis that decides 
between two mothers is just as sex-biased as a genetics-based analysis between a father 
and a mother.   A woman who donates ova to reproduction does the same thing as a man 
who donates sperm—the person contributes half the genetic complement of the created 
embryo.   A gestational mother nurtures that embryo into a child.  Pregnancy is essential 
to reproduction.  The embryo could sit in a freezer forever, be left in the sunlight, be 
submerged in the ocean, or float in a fresh water pond, but none of those methods allow it 
to grow into a child.  An analysis that ends up dismissing the gestational contribution to 
the creation of a child and relies solely on the genetic contribution, which is what the 
court did in the Perry-Rogers case (a rose by any other name would smell as sweet), is 
fundamentally flawed and sex-biased.  Therefore, I urge courts and legislatures to reject a 
genetics-based analysis of parenthood. 
IV.  PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE 
 I suggest in Part III that contract-based, intent-based, UPA-based, and genetics-
based approaches to assigning legal parentage in cases of ART mix-ups do not work.  In 
the absence of an existing approach that fairly balances all the relevant concerns and puts 
the interests of the children of ART mix-ups first, a new approach must be developed.  I 
propose deciding ART mix-up parentage disputes through lenses of  (1) labor-based 
contributions (caregiving and responsibility) and (2) existing relationships (child-
                                                 
190  Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology?  The History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental 
Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 63 (2004) (internal citations omitted). 
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centeredness) in utero and ex utero.191  Ideally, legislatures can enact statutes that reflect 
the values and interests promoted by this alternative approach.  Perhaps the drafters of the 
Model Act will be persuaded to revise or amend their Model Act in response to these 
concerns.  Surely the Model Act would benefit from a separate section that responds to 
the painful contests between hopeful parents-to-be in ART mix-up cases. 
A.  A Labor-Based Theory of Parentage 
           In order for a mistakenly placed embryo or sperm cell to grow into a baby, a lot of 
labor is required.  Maternity, or nine months gestation,192 minimally involves nurturing,  
physical carrying and transporting,  oxygenation, toxin and waste filtering/excretion, 
nutrition transfer, hydration transfer, sheltering, body stretching and expanding, increased 
periods of fatigue,  temperature regulation, exercise and motion, abstinence from other 
activities, indigestion, cravings and changing tastes, hormonal changes affecting moods, 
changes in the texture of a pregnant woman’s hair and skin, swollen extremities, 
numerous blood and urine tests, sometimes varicose veins, often nausea,  and often 
multiple medical or midwifery appointments with intrusive physical and privacy-
invading procedures..  Then there is the arduous work of parturition (or labor and 
delivery, as it is commonly called) including expulsion of the placenta, and often the 
additional intrusion of fetal monitoring during labor.  In cases where the child or children 
in utero are in distress, there may be the major surgery of a cesarean section.  And post-
birth there may be the additional intensive physical labor of breast-feeding, or lactation 
                                                 
191 The italicized phrases, meaning “in the womb” and “out of the womb” respectively, have become a part 
of the English language of assisted reproductive technologies and will not continue to be italicized in this 
article. 
 
192 It is actually longer than nine months, or forty weeks, if the baby is full-term.  Only someone who 
wasn’t at the end of a pregnancy and counting every day would discard the extra week or more.  
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and nursing. Even if breastfeeding does not occur, there is the labor and physicality 
involved in restoring one’s body to “normal” after pregnancy.   Any realistic legal 
analysis of parentage issues cannot disregard, or even discount, this maternal work and 
contribution to the growth of the embryo into a child.    
Undoubtedly, pregnancy, labor and giving birth are intensive work.  These 
activities are primal and biological.  They also involve conscious, often difficult, and 
sometimes life-threatening, physical labor.  For every moment of a known pregnancy, the 
pregnant woman makes a conscious choice to stay pregnant “as it is her body that 
sustains the preganacy.”193  One analogy might help clarify this.  Because a man’s body 
has the capacity to grow stronger chest and arm muscles than a woman’s body, that does 
not convert lifting heavy loads into just “something natural” rather than the intense, 
physical work it is.  Likewise, because a woman’s body has the capacity to grow an 
embryo into a child does not convert pregnancy, labor, and delivery into just “something 
natural” rather than the intense, physical work it is. 
Understanding and acknowledging the labor of gestation and birth is critical to 
any just analysis of parenthood disputes after an ART mix-up.  To resolve parent disputes 
by assigning parenthood on the basis of genetic contributions alone, and ignoring 
pregnancy, labor, and delivery (hereinafter pregnancy), is blatantly sexist, whether 
intentionally or not.  Both men and women make genetic contributions to the birth of a 
child.  To that extent, an analysis that credits genetic contribution can be even-handed.  
However, as discussed above, women also make a pregnancy contribution to the birth of 
                                                 
193  Julien S. Murphy, Should Pregnancies Be Sustained in Brain-Dead Women?: A Philosophical 
Discussion of Postmortem Pregnancy, in HEALING TECHNOLOGY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 135, 137 
(Kathryn Strother Ratcliff ed., Univ. of Mich. Press 1989) (arguing that respect for women requires an 
understanding of pregnancy as a conscious activity). 
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a child.   An analysis that credits all of men’s biological and labor-based contributions to 
the birth of a child, but only a small portion of women’s biological and labor-based 
contributions to the birth of a child, is undoubtedly sex-biased.  A just analysis must 
credit all of both sexes’ biological and labor contributions or none of both sexes’ 
biological and labor contributions to be fair.  Only by working from the hidden 
assumption of a male norm can the biological and labor contribution of gestation to a 
child’s existence be deemed irrelevant to determining parentage.   
If an analysis of parentage claims uses a “human” norm, rather than a “male” 
norm, then we can assess all of the male and female biological and labor contributions 
fairly.   If we select an approach that discounts, ignores or denigrates one group of 
people’s labor contributions to parenthood, while we prioritize and value a different 
group’s labor and biological contributions, we are acting in a biased or unequal way.  A 
genetics-based approach to determining parenthood, at least in the context of ART mix-
ups, does just that—it values one group of people’s labor and biological contributions to 
reproduction (males and female ova donors) and discounts or ignores another group of 
people’s labor and biological contributions to reproduction (gestating mothers).  
 The biological process of reproduction alone cannot create a child, particularly a 
child resulting from ARTs.   Child creation involves conscious, emotional, labor-
intensive activity.  It is that labor aspect of creating a child upon which I want to focus 
now.  My preferred analysis for determining parentage in ART mix-up cases is based on 
the actual labor contribution to the child’s birth made by each person intending to parent 
the child.  
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Children are not commodities or property.  The following argument is not 
intended to even imply that they are.  I am completely opposed to any analysis of 
children that treats them as or like property.  Yet there are some things about property 
concepts that by analogy seem particularly relevant to children created through ARTs.194  
John Locke famously developed something called the “labor theory of value” in his 
philosophizing about property and “natural law.”195   While Locke’s theory has some 
serious flaws and has been subject to significant critiques,196 particularly in its 
assumption that “nature” is just there for the taking, it also contains some nuggets of 
wisdom that make sense in the context of pregnancy and child-creation.197  Locke’s 
theory, in its most simplified form, proposes that if one takes something from nature and 
adds his or her labor to it by improving it or changing it into something useful, then it 
becomes the laborer’s property.  The value of the item as property comes from the labor 
that transformed it from its natural state into something useful.198  Adam Mossoff argues 
                                                 
194 Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 159 (2005) (suggesting the combined applicability of property interests and personhood 
interests in embryos). 
 
195JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §27, at 287 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988).   For 
some recent renditions of Locke’s labor theory of value, see Anupam Chander,  The New, New Property, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 715 (2003); Jessica Berg, supra note 194; Alex Geisinger, Uncovering the Myth of a 
Jobs/Nature Trade-off, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 115 (2001) (attributing the labor theory of value to Adam 
Smith and Karl Marx). 
 
196 See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993) (rejecting a Lockean theory of 
property and developing a Hegelian, personality-based theory of property).  See also JEREMY WALDRON, 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). 
 
197 Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-
Sufficiency, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13 (1999) [hereinafter Fineman] (arguing a woman’s 
entitlement to property-like rights against the state for their caregiving labor). 
 
198 Karl Marx also developed a labor theory of value.  He reasoned that labor is the source of all the 
“surplus value” that is created in property. Karl Marx, Wage Labor and Capital, reprinted in the MARX-
ENGELS READER (Robert C. Tucker ed. 1978); Karl Marx, Das Capital, reprinted in the MARX-ENGELS 
READER at 344–61; Raj Bhala, Marxist Origins of the “Anti-Third World” Claim, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
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that when Locke uses the term “labor,” he means “productive activity.”199  Locke’s labor 
theory of value has often been analyzed as a theory rooted in values of “desert” or 
“reward.”   The laborer deserves the property as a reward for the value his labor has 
added to it. 
What could be more of a productive activity, more “labor deserving of reward,” 
than gestating a child?  Parallel to how Locke’s labor theory of value was articulated 
above, if one takes gametes (genetic and biological parts of nature) and adds her labor to 
them (this time meaning reproductive activity, such as pregnancy, labor, and delivery, as 
described above), then that labor creates the utility or value that is the resulting child.  As 
the person who adds her labor to nature to create something of value, a gestational mother 
gets first priority as parent under a labor-based theory of parenthood.200    This approach 
rewards reproductive labor with a priority of parenthood.  As a theory for assigning 
parenthood, it has the advantage of tying parenthood to the notion of desert or reward for 
labor input.  However, standing alone, it is too parent-centered, rather than child-
centered, to deal with the whole issue.  Holding in abeyance for a moment the ways in 
which this labor-based theory of parenthood combines with a relationship, child-centered 
basis for parenthood, it is useful to play out how a labor-based theory applies to others 
                                                                                                                                                 
132 (2000). Marx criticized capitalist economies for taking the surplus value created by labor and giving it 
all to the capitalists or bourgeoisie, instead of to the proletariat laborers. 
 
199 Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155 (2002); Adam Mossoff, 
Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001). 
 
200 Hypothetically, in cases of collaborative reproduction (gestational surrogacy, and even traditional 
surrogacy), a gestational mother may be able, with appropriate information given beforehand, voluntarily, 
with medical and legal advice, and appreciating the consequences of her actions, to contract in writing to 
waive her parental priority in exchange for a reasonable payment for her labor, services, and risk-taking.  
This very important issue cannot be addressed in the context of mix-ups, however. 
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than the gestational mother.  Then I will take up the issue of the child-centered relational 
analysis. 
B.    Proposed Labor-Based Priorities  
           If legislatures or statute drafters decide that it is just to fashion an analytical 
response to ART mix-ups based on labor contributions, then I propose the following 
prioritized list.201  As I suggested earlier, a new article governing parentage disputes in 
cases of ART embryo or gamete mix-ups should be added to the UPA or to the Model 
Act.  This proposed article should expressly base parentage determinations on labor-
based (and relationship-based, see infra Part IV.C ) contributions in ART mix-up 
cases.202  Applying a labor-based analysis will generate a presumptive list of priorities for 
assigning parenthood.   
Under a labor-based approach for ART mix-up cases, the gestational mother gets 
first priority as the child’s parent based on her incomparable type and amount of labor in 
creating the child.  If the gestational mother chooses to have a child as a single woman, 
and chooses not to share parenting and caregiving responsibilities with another adult, 
then she is the sole legal parent.203  If the gestational mother plans and creates a child 
with another adult who shares the pregnancy process and will share parenting and 
caregiving responsibilities after the child’s birth, the chosen co-parent is the person who 
                                                 
201 Similar prioritized lists are crafted by legislatures for family health decisions/surrogacy acts, for 
example, where specific priorities are given to proxy decision-makers based on the legislative assumptions 
about relationship connections.  See, e.g., N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2965 (2)(a) (McKinney 2002). 
  
202The rules this article proposes for a statutory supplement to the UPA or Model Act are limited to cases of 
ART mix-ups.  This article does not express an opinion about whether these rules should apply in different 
reproductive situations, whether technologically assisted or not.  
 
203 Susan Buchweitz would win her lawsuit under this priority rule for single women.  Robert B., supra 
note 2.  Were this analysis to apply to non-mix-up disputes over children conceived by ARTs, Mildred 
Schmit and Deborah D. would also prevail.  In re O.G.M., supra note 177; Steven S., supra note 131. 
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contributes the next most labor to a child’s creation and birth.  This adult, chosen by the 
gestational mother as a parenting partner and the next greatest labor contributor, is also 
the child’s legal parent.204  The couple (the gestating mother and her chosen parenting 
partner, whether male, female, intersexed or transsexual) who chooses to create the child,  
who prepares for the child’s birth, who plans to take the child into their home to nurture 
and love, and who jointly acknowledge the child as their own, should be statutorily 
granted parental priority over all others.205  They are the child’s parents and a statutory 
article should entitle them to be listed as parents on the child’s birth certificate.  Neither 
of them should be required to adopt the child or go through any legal process to confirm 
their legal parental rights.   
Once this parenting unit has been established, and if the parents in this unit want 
to parent the child, the analysis need go no further.  No one else would have legally 
recognized parental rights, standing to challenge the parental assignments, or standing to 
seek third-party visitation.   It does not matter that these legal parents were mistakenly 
given the wrong embryo or wrong gametes to nurture.  The labor and nurturance they 
have invested in bringing the child to life entitles them to the privilege of being the 
child’s legal parents, if they so want.   
If the gestational couple does not want to parent the child because of the ART 
mix-up, then they must relinquish all rights to parent the child in a formal written 
document that is filed with a court.  The validity of this relinquishment turns on its 
                                                 
204 In the cases of ART mix-ups, this gives second parent priority to the gestational mother’s husband, 
domestic partner, civilly-united partner, significant other or an unmarried cohabiting male or female.  As 
applied to the mix-up cases discussed earlier, this gives priority to Robert Fasano (and Mr. A in the British 
case)  Perry-Rogers, supra note 18; A. v. B., supra note 25. 
 
205 In some unusual cases of communal living arrangements, this parental unit may even consist of more 
than two people. 
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voluntariness and informed consent, not standards relating to parental terminations or 
parental fitness.  In a case of an ART mix-up in which a gestational couple formally 
relinquishes their parental rights, a genetic mother who wants to parent the child of the 
ART mix-up, along with her chosen parenting partner, if she has one, has the next ranked 
priority as parents.  A genetic mother achieves her legal parental priority in ART mix-up 
disputes through her labor and effort in creating and offering the ova for germination.  If 
she wants to parent the child and the gestational couple has formally relinquished their 
parental rights, she becomes the legal parent without having to adopt.   Her physical 
experiences of ova removal, her labor (including coping with hormone treatments and the 
physical and emotional changes they entail, ovarian hyperstimulation, temperature 
monitoring, travel to doctors, pharmacies and clinics), and her other mental and 
emotional contributions to the process of ova donation far exceed the labor contributed 
by others lower on the priority list who might want to parent the child.   
If the genetic mother intends to co-parent with the genetic father, then he acquires 
her level of priority to be named a legal parent without adoption based on his cooperative 
labor with her to create and plan for the child.   If the genetic mother intends to co-parent 
the child with someone other than the genetic father, her chosen co-parent (who endures 
the experience, and possibly contributes labor to the hormonal treatments and ova 
extraction procedures) is granted the same priority as she has to be declared a legal parent 
without adoption.  If the genetic mother plans to parent as a single mother, no one else 
acquires a priority equal to hers.  In other words, the genetic mother and her chosen 
coparenting partner, whether the genetic father or not, have priority directly under the 
gestational mother (and her chosen coparenting partner). 
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 If the genetic mother donates her ova for monetary compensation or 
anonymously with no intention of parenting the ART-created child, then she and her 
relationship partner, if she has one at the time of donation, must relinquish all parental 
claims in a written document filed with a court immediately prior to or at the time of 
donation.206  If that document is properly filed, parental responsibilities, along with the 
right to be named the legal parent, would be offered to the next greatest labor contributor, 
and therefore the next ranked party, the genetic father (and his chosen co-parenting 
partner).  Comparable to the rules applying to the gestational mother and her partner, if 
the genetic mother and her chosen co-parenting partner do not want to parent the child 
because of the ART mix-up, after they formally relinquish all parental claims, the genetic 
father who wants to parent the child, and his chosen co-parenting partner, if he has one, 
acquire legally cognizable parenthood claims, under a labor-based approach.  If all the 
proper parental rights relinquishment documents are filed with the court (by the 
gestational mother and her partner and the genetic mother and her partner), the genetic 
father and his co-parent may be named the legal parents on the birth certificates without 
having to adopt.   If the genetic father wants to be a single parent and has no partner, he 
alone will be named as the legal parent on the birth certificate, and will have the same 
statutory rights as a single woman to raise the child without a legally recognized 
coparent.  If the genetic father is not willing to parent the child because of the ART mix-
                                                 
206 This process would eliminate post-dispute manipulations of the ART controversies, particularly but not 
exclusively in the context of ART mix-ups, such as the one that arose in Rice v. Flynn, supra note 113 
(finding that in competing claims for maternity, a formerly-anonymous ova donor is the legal mother of the 
children, instead of the gestational surrogacy, sending the case back to the lower court to determine 
whether the ova donor had waived her parental rights.) 
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up, he must formally relinquish his rights in a document filed with a court, as the other 
people in this priority list were required to do. 
In each of the first three ranked parenting levels, the labor-based theory prioritizes 
a biological contributor and a co-parent, if there is one, who may have neither a 
gestational nor genetic relationship with the child, but is granted parenting priority equal 
to the biological parent.  Biological contribution often correlates with the amount of labor 
contribution, but not exclusively.  Labor also consists of the emotional and physical 
support of a gestating woman, and also all the organizing, planning, and implementing 
work that brings about the birth of the child and sets up a home for him or her.  Thus, this 
parental priority ranking includes prospective parents engaged in ARTs who have no 
biological connection, but have contributed the labor required to create the child they 
intend to parent.  This differs significantly from the ways courts respond to the 
nonbiologically connected coparent in ART disputes. 207 
Some people utilize ARTs to create children without ever making a biological 
(gestational or genetic) contribution.  Couples even have the ability to create an ART-
conceived child where neither couple member makes a biological contribution to the 
                                                 
207 See, e.g., Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (Denise B. made 
neither a genetic nor gestational contribution to the child because of the IVF mix-up); Matter of Baby M, 
537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988) (Elizabeth Stern made neither a genetic nor gestational contribution);  J.F. 
v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1 . (Pa.Com.Pl. 2004) (Mr. Flynn’s fiancé made neither a gestational nor genetic 
contribution.  As an aside, someone should write an entire article on this J.F. v. D.B. case.  So far, it has 
had the following further permutations. See Flynn v. Bimber, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th 261 (Pa.Ct. Com.Pl. 2005); 
Rice v. Flynn, No. 22416, 2005 WL 2140576 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2005), and J.F. v. D.B., 2006-Ohio-
1175, 2006 WL 630009 (Ohio App. 9 Dist., March 15, 2006).) In each of the cited cases, the adult without 
a biological contribution was a woman who engaged in the ART process with her partner in order to create 
a child for her family.  Despite the fact that courts did not recognize them as parents or persons with 
standing to assert maternity does not undermine the claim that they were people using ARTs to create 
children for their families.  In addition, men like John Buzzanca also utilize the ART process to create 
children for their families, even though they do not have a genetic connection to the child.  In re Buzzanca, 
72 Cal.Rptr.2d 80 (Cal.App. 1998).  Married men whose wives or partners are medically inseminated by 
sperm from anonymous donors also have no biological genetic connection to their child created using 
ARTs. 
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creation of the child,208 although this is more unusual since most couples use ARTs in 
order to have a biologically related child.  In cases where people or couples without 
biological connections use these technologies to create a child, the couple or individuals 
are the intended parents.209   The intended parents’ labor toward creating the child gives 
them the next level of parental priority, if all the parties with earlier priorities have 
formally relinquished their parental rights in a document filed with a court.   
In the nearly unimaginable case that none of the parties who engaged in the 
assisted reproductive technologies to produce a child is willing to parent the child of a 
mix-up, and each has relinquished his or her parental claims in writing, the child should 
immediately be made available for adoption.210   
 In sum, the parental priority list in cases of ART mix-up mistakes proceeds as 
follows: 
a. gestational mother (and her chosen co-parent, if there is one)211 
b. genetic mother (and her chosen co-parent, if there is one) 
c. genetic father (and his chosen co-parent, if there is one) 
d. intended parent (and chosen co-parent) with no genetic or 
gestational connections to the child 
                                                 
208 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).(Neither John nor 
Luanne Buzzanca made genetic or gestational contributions to Jaycee.)  
 
209 The Model Act uses the term “prospective parents.”  
 
210 In this last case, the adults who agreed to create the child should have fiscal responsibility for the child 
until an adoption is final. 
 
211 If the gestating mother and the co-parent end their relationship soon after conception, then the labor 
contributed by the co-parent is not sufficient to give him/her the labor-based parental priority of the 
gestating mother.  At that point, the former relationship partner of the gestating mother, because the 
relationship is terminated, falls down to a nonbiological “intended parent” priority for parenthood status. 
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e. adoption by stranger uninvolved in the ART process that created 
the child. 
Co-parents may be married, in civil unions, may be domestic partners, just co-
habiters, share parenting but live apart, be same-sex or different sex, or may be very close 
friends.  The co-parent relationship is created by the choice of the gestational, genetic or 
intended parent, not by any formal legal processes, and by active labor in the creation 
and/or parenting of the child.   
 Having presented this theory to several audiences, including my students, I 
repeatedly hear concerns that giving the gestational mother first priority due to her labor 
contribution is completely sex-biased, as well as inappropriately dismissive of the 
interests, commitments, and emotional trauma of the infertile female prospective parent 
(whether she is a genetic contributor or not) and/or the infertile male prospective parent 
(whether he is a genetic contributor or not).  In response to the sex-bias claim, I have 
already argued that sex-based biases enter into the analysis when women’s gestational 
contributions and labor are ignored or discounted, not when they are given their due.  It is 
true that women who are gestational mothers will always get priority over men in the 
quest for legal parentage of children created through ART mix-ups.212   The labor-based 
priority given to the gestational mother is a function of the actual physical and emotional 
differences in labor contributed to the creation of the child.  Men and infertile women 
who cannot gestate a child cannot achieve this level of priority in mix-up cases because 
they never contribute the labor, and for no other reason.  A child simply cannot come into 
                                                 
212 The only man over whom a gestational mother will not have priority, because she shares her legal 
parental priority with him, is a man with whom she has chosen to have a committed co-parenting 
relationship. 
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existence without the invaluable nine-plus months of labor by the gestational mother.213   
The labor-based approach does give equal parental priority to the gestating mother’s 
chosen coparent during the pregnancy and at the time of the birth.  This chosen coparent 
can be a man or woman, so it is not only women who get the first parental priority.  
In response to the claim that a labor-based theory is dismissive of the rights and 
pain of an infertile woman who cannot carry a child or an infertile man in the mix-up 
cases, I believe the critique is misplaced.  A labor-based theory recognizes the terrible 
wrong suffered by the infertile women or men who are nongestational parties to the mix-
ups.  Their labors and investments in the creation of a child are not ignored or devalued.   
But no matter how seriously their contributions to a child’s existence are valued, those 
contributions cannot be equated with the labor invested by a gestational mother and her 
partner.  The ART mix-up has shattered the infertile couple’s hopes and dreams without 
their consent.  Their intense emotional and physical investment has come to naught, at 
least so far.  Although their grief and the pain they suffer is worthy of our deepest 
sympathy and significant damages from the clinic whose mistake harmed them, their 
suffering ought not make them legal parents.  Labor causing the growth and development 
of an embryo into a child deserves to be rewarded with legally recognized parental rights, 
not suffering, no matter how egregious the mix-up causing the suffering.  The law 
                                                 
213 Though I hesitate to cite these cases, because their reasoning is so flawed, the logic of Geduldig, G.E. v. 
Gilbert, and Bray all indicate that treating pregnant women differently from “non-pregnant persons” is not  
sex-biased under the Constitution or Title VII.  Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974); Gen. Elec. 
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137–38 (1976); Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic 506 U.S. 263, 271 
(1993).  See also Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003)(deciding that a health insurance plan 
that excludes surgical implantation procedures for infertility treatments, but includes other infertility 
treatments, does not discriminate against women in violation of Title VII or violate the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, because both men and women suffer from infertility and need coverage.)  Likewise, 
treating gestating women differently from non-gestating persons is not sex-biased.  This marginal argument 
is made to persuade naysayers who are convinced that my proposal is sex discrimination under current 
interpretations.  In truth, I strongly disagree with the logic in all of those cases, but still feel confident 
arguing about the sex equality, rather than perpetuated sex bias, promoted by my proposed priority rules. 
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compensates suffering caused by someone else’s negligent, reckless or intentional actions 
with damages, not the assignment of legal statuses and the creation of new legal 
relationships.214 
The case of the Rogerses, for example, in the Perry-Rogers v. Fasano ART 
embryo mix-up, illustrates this best.  Deborah Perry-Rogers was sadly unable to sustain a 
pregnancy when she was implanted with her and her husband’s embryos.  An embryo 
that does not implant in a womb cannot become a child, no matter how much one wishes 
it or hopes (or intends).   The new reproductive technologies can do a lot to assist couples 
suffering from infertility, but they cannot guarantee a child, even if a healthy embryo is 
successfully created.  Deborah and Richard Rogers were able to create embryos, but they 
were not able to create children.  Only a multi-month pregnancy and birth can yield a 
child.  Donna Fasano was the woman who provided the labor and means for the embryo 
to grow into a child.  And so, as the woman who gestated and gave birth to the child, she 
should be the legal mother under a labor-based theory of parentage for ART mix-up 
cases..  Robert Fasano, who supported and planned with Donna Fasano all during the 
pregnancy and intended to co-parent, should be the legal father without having to adopt.  
Their legal rights should protect them from all parental rights claims by any third parties.  
The unclear rules in existence when Mrs. Fasano gave birth led the Fasanos to make a 
serious mistake when the Rogerses sued them.  At that point in time the Fasanos, no 
doubt believing it was their “duty” and would be required by law, agreed to transfer 
custody on the condition that they were granted generous visitation.  Had the labor-based 
theory of parentage in ART mix-up cases been the statutory law of New York, and had 
                                                 
214 I have written elsewhere on the inadequacy of monetary damages to respond to tortiously-caused harms, 
and these mix-up cases seem to fall squarely within that concern.  Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re) Torts: 
Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848 (1990).  
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they known they were absolutely protected by that law, they may never have signed the 
settlement with the Rogerses.  The contractual settlement, for all its seeming force and 
the care that went into negotiating it, ended up not being worth the paper it was written 
on, because the Rogerses immediately undermined the agreement and left the Fasanos 
unable even to visit their child.   
If a gestational mother plans to parent alone and engages in the ART process 
making that plan clear to the clinic, as Susan Buchweitz did, or absolutely clear to a 
known sperm donor, then the statute must allow her to parent alone, with no interference 
by any strangers.  The result in the Buchweitz case, Robert B. v. Susan B., was terribly 
wrong.  Robert, who should have been eliminated as a legal parent under a labor-based 
priority system, undermined Susan Buchweitz’s labor-based parental priority.    It is 
wrong that Susan is forced to share her son with a stranger, and that the child is forced to 
have a relationship with Robert and a visitation schedule that interferes with the rhythms 
of their lives.  I have no reason to doubt that Robert and Denise love Daniel very much 
and enrich his life in many ways, as does his relationship with his sister, Madeline.  But 
they should not have been made part of Daniel’s life.  It is hard to balance the benefit 
they give Daniel against the damage Daniel suffers from the stresses and strains caused to 
his mother by the court’s resolution of this mix-up.   The result in Robert B. is not win-
win as the court may have thought. 
A labor-based theory alone, even with its clear priorities for mix-up cases, may 
not adequately protect a child’s interest in maintaining existing relationships and stability, 
so the theory must be supplemented by a relational, child-centered component.   That 
additional facet of the proposed analysis is discussed next. 
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C. Relational, Child-Centeredness  
An appropriate and just theory of parentage in ART mix-up cases must put the 
child’s needs and relationships at the center of the analysis.  Children survive only 
because they have relationships with adults who care for them, who feed, shelter, clothe, 
and generally nurture them.  Whether framed as an approach that respects caregiving215 
or one that respects relationships, child-centeredness requires that existing relationships 
of dependence and responsibility between children and adults be preferred over proven 
genetic connections or parents’ needs.216   Fortunately, and perhaps not coincidentally, 
this relationship-sustaining approach meshes very well with the labor-based analysis 
already proposed.   
Pregnancy, if chosen and sustained, is an ongoing relationship between the 
growing child and mother.  Children develop powerful bonds in utero.217  In the best of 
all possible worlds, those bonds are reinforced after birth through a continuing 
relationship with their gestational mother. 218  During a mother’s pregnancy, the child 
                                                 
215 MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES (1995); see also Fineman, supra, note 197. 
 
216 Niccol Kording, Nature v. Nurture: Child Left Fatherless and Family-Less When Nature Prevails in 
Paternity Actions, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 811, 814 (2004) [hereinafter Kording] (advocating a child-centered, 
rather than parent-centered approach to paternity, looking at relationships over biology.)  Niccol Kording 
has written this persuasive article that makes the points I am making in this subsection much better than I 
do.  See also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A  Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ 
Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993).  
 
217 Marjorie L. Rand, As it was in the Beginning: The Significance of Infant Bonding in the Development of 
Self and Relationships, 7 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOTHERAPY ASSOCIATION 40 (2004) [hereinafter 
Rand] (and articles cited therein). 
 
218 Sometimes mothers die or become incapacitated in childbirth, and sometimes mothers know that they 
cannot properly care for their child, so they relinquish the child to another by terminating their parental 
rights.  Gestational mothers may also contract to gestate some other couple’s embryo.  In most of these 
cases, the effects on the child of severing the in utero bond seem to be surmountable.  But severing that 
bond and not forming a substitute bond in the first three months may create permanent harm.  There are 
indications that the absence of bond-formation impacts the child in attachment disorders. Terry Levy & 
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may also be able to form looser bonds with the co-parent, if as some scientists suggest, 
the child can hear and feel external things while in the womb.219  But even if that is not 
so, from the birth onward, the gestating mother’s parenting partner forms a relationship 
with the child through caregiving.  The child becomes dependent on both caregiver 
parents, if there are two.  They assume responsibility for the child’s well-being.  These 
relationships do not depend upon genetics at all.   Legislatures ought to amend the UPA, 
adopt an amended version of the Model Act, or create a new statute to recognize that this 
relationship of caregiving and taking responsibility for the child, accompanied by 
preconception and prebirth labor in the case of ART mix-ups, is the foundation of legal 
parenthood.   
 Courts deciding ART mix-up cases have erred in their analyses because they take 
a parent-centered approach.  No doubt this has a lot to do with the fact that the parties to 
the dispute before the court are the adults competing to be named the child’s parent(s), 
and their lawyers shape the arguments from their clients’ perspectives.  However, if there 
is a child who has been born because of an ART mix-up, the law’s first duty ought be to 
respond to the child’s needs and further the child’s interests.  Children require physically 
and emotionally nurturing relationships;220 stable, consistent long-term relationships with 
adults who are their parents (and children who are their siblings); and parents who are 
                                                                                                                                                 
Michael Orlans, Attatchment Disorder, Antisocial Personality, and Violence, 7 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN 
PSYCHOTHERAPY ASSOCIATION 18 (2004). 
 
219 Rand, supra note 217. 
 
220 Justice Kennard makes this point in her dissent in Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.1993) 
(Kennard, J. dissenting):  
 Factors that are pertinent to good parenting, and thus that are in a child’s best interests, 
include the ability to nurture the child physically and psychologically…, and to provide 
ethical and intellectual guidance….  Also critical to a child’s best interests is the “well 
recognized right” of every child “to stability and continuity.” 
Id. at 800. 
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committed to working for their child’s benefit—who desire to provide the labor necessary 
to rear the child and help him/her successfully grow into adulthood.221  Children of ART 
mix-ups benefit from a single, loving home with one parent or one set of parents, if 
possible;222 a family free of interference by strangers (who are not known to the child or 
the child’s parents and with whom the child’s parents have no relationship at all); and a 
parent or parents who do not have the stress and anxiety generated by the imminent threat 
that someone else might claim their children.223   
A focus on the child and the child’s needs for stability and existing relationships 
underscores the flaws in the ART mix-up cases that have reached the courts.   Legal cases 
of ART mix-ups that have been decided by courts are few, but so far the courts within the 
United States that have heard these lawsuits seem to ignore the child’s needs in favor of 
the disputing parents’ interests.224   In Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, the baby was ripped from 
the stability and security of the only parents he knew, the mother in whose womb he 
grew, the father with whom he had bonded, and the brother with whom he shared that 
womb and the first months of his life, all in the name of privileging some parents’ claims 
                                                 
221 Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 323 (2004). 
 
222 The stability of one home is often preferable to the disruptions of trying to maintain two or more homes, 
although if a child has an existing relationship with two adults who separate, it is important to allow the 
child to maintain that relationship if he or she wants and needs to. 
 
223 Children also need medical and health information with genetic implications for their well-being; 
information about their genetic parents when they are old enough to independently inquire; and information 
about their genetic siblings at that time as well.  Provisions for access to this information can be written 
into the statute.  These concerns are addressed infra. 
 
224 A. v. B. [2003] EWHC 259 (Q.B.), the Leeds Clinic mix-up case,  does consciously preserve the 
relationship between the children and adults they know as parents, but worrisomely requires the gestational 
mother’s husband to adopt the child and permits the genetic sperm donor, who became the biological father 
by virtue of the mix-up, to be declared the father on the birth certificate.  
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to genetic consanguinity.225  This is a parent-centered approach, for sure.  Undoubtedly, 
this little boy was forced to suffer trauma by the court’s ruling.  In Robert B., little 
Daniel’s tranquil and loving home was brutally disrupted by the maelstrom of a contested 
child paternity, custody, and visitation battle that was aggravated by the court’s rulings.  
The law encouraged the dispute in the first instance by its failure to say in advance what 
would happen in the event of an ART mix-up.226   
While not an ART mix-up case, the Sean H. case reveals another court-imposed, 
parent-centered approach that separates a young child from the only father she knows, 
one who loves her and whom she loves, and one who has taken legal and fiscal 
responsibility for her as well.227  The court in Sean H. severs the existing parent-child 
relational bond, all in the name of genetics and parents’ rights.  In other cases, children 
are ripped from their relationships with a co-parent whom their biological parent had 
originally chosen for them (a same-sex partner or a stepparent), and from a child-parent 
relationship that their biological parent had nurtured.  The law and disputing adults are 
wrong to disregard children’s existing parental relationships in a battle over “ownership”; 
children are not property to be moved around to the person with “better title.”228  Surely 
this is as true for children of ART mix-ups as any other children. 
                                                 
 225 Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
 
226 Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). As Professor Sarah Ramsey noted in 
her comments to this section of this Article, a clear rule that states in advance that Robert is the legal father 
would still lead to the disruptive custody/visitation dispute.  Rule clarity is helpful, but the rule must be 
selected in a manner that avoids disputes between possible parents, rather than one that creates an 
opportunity for this kind of disruption in the child’s life.  The proposed labor-based, relational approach in 
this article meets both criteria of clarity and stability.  
 
227 Sean H. v. Leila H., 783 N.Y.S.2d 785 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).  
 
228Accord, Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology?  The History and Future of Paternity Law and 
Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 30 (2004) (discussing how inappropriate entitlement 
and property-like understandings of children and parentage are). 
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Making wrenching decisions for children’s lives that destroy established physical, 
psychological, and emotional bonds in the name of genetics or the parents’ interests is 
reminiscent of a regime where children were punished for their “illegitimacy.”  Children 
of ART mix-ups are being “punished” for the clinic’s mistake.  Illegitimacy and ART 
mix-ups both relate to their progenitors’ or others’ conduct over which the children have 
no control, yet potentially deprive innocent children of what they need most.  No matter 
how wrongful the conduct causing the ART mix-up, we cannot justify a legal regime that 
puts the prospective parents’ needs in front of the children’s, if those needs conflict.229  
The Rogerses’ needs should not have been placed before the baby’s.  The court in Perry-
Rogers punished the child for what the court believed was his gestational parents’ 
wrongful conduct: 
We are also cognizant that a bond may well develop between a gestational 
mother and the infant she carried, before, during and immediately after the 
birth…. In the present case, any boding on the part of Akeil to his 
gestational mother and her family was the direct result of the Fasanos’ 
failure to take timely action upon being informed of the clinic’s admitted 
error.  Defendants cannot be permitted to purposefully act in such a way as 
to create a bond, and then rely upon it for their assertion of rights to which 
they would not otherwise be entitled.230 
 
This parent-centered approach painfully failed Akeil, who through no fault of his own 
formed relational bonds with his gestational mother, her husband, and his “twin” brother, 
bonds that the court even acknowledges, but freely severs.231  At a minimum, our laws 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
229 Kording, supra note 216, at 862–63. 
 
230 Perry-Rogers, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 19, 26.   
 
231 The Perry-Rogers case became inordinately more complicated when the Fasanos agreed to give up 
custody based on the consideration of the Rogerses’ promises that they would have consistent and regular 
visitation rights.  Once the Fasanos complied with their promise by relinquishing custody to the Rogerses, 
the Rogerses reneged on their promise and challenged the standing of the Fasanos to claim visitation.  
Ironically, the Fasanos, who were trying to be of generous spirit and to find a way to meet the parents’ 
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should have evolved sufficiently to recognize that children should not be punished for 
their parents’ misconduct.232 
     Family law suffers from a kind of schizophrenia.  It tries to balance constitutional 
concerns about parental rights with concerns about a child’s best interests.233  Sometimes 
those two concerns cannot peacefully coexist.  In situations, for example, where two 
loving parents claim rights to a child’s custody, visitation, and control in a divorce 
dispute, the judicial system prioritizes the needs of children by applying a “best interests 
of the child” approach.   The parental desires must yield to the children’s best interests.234   
                                                                                                                                                 
needs, ended up being labeled as bad actors, while the Rogerses, who were willing to manipulate the 
situation at all costs in order to get “their” genetic child, even to the extent of  blatantly breaching their 
agreement with the Fasanos (one cannot help but wonder whether they ever intended to keep the promise in 
the first place), were not painted in a bad light in the court’s opinion. Id. at 22.  
 
232   For a few examples of court language to this effect, see Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
406 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972):  
 
 But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.  
Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic 
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual 
responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and 
penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of 
deterring the parent. Courts are powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered 
by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike 
down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth where—as in this case—the 
classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise;  
 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977)):  
 
At the least, those who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our 
law should be prepared to bear the consequences, including, but not limited to, 
deportation. But the children of those illegal entrants are not comparably situated. 
Their “parents have the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms," and 
presumably the ability to remove themselves from the State's jurisdiction; but the 
children who are plaintiffs in these cases "can affect neither their parents' conduct nor 
their own status."    
  
 
233 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 
234 This Article is neither an endorsement nor critique of the best interests standard in co-parenting disputes, 
which requires a separate analysis.  Here I only reflect on how courts claim to do their work at this time. 
 
Bender, ART mix-ups  Draft: April 3, 2006  
 Page 80 of 8089 
Parental disputes that are governed by the “best interests of the child” standard are 
generally between two or more adults (those who are the child’s biological, legal, and 
often functional, parents) who created and reared the child, and who are or have been in a 
relationship with one another and the child (emotional or even contractual, as in some 
collaborative reproduction cases.235)  Children’s “best interests” usually involve 
preserving their relationships with their adult caregivers.  Courts and legal scholars have 
recognized these children’s interests by developing concepts like psychological parent, 
parent by estoppel, de facto parent, and presumptive parent in order to preserve a child’s 
emotionally dependent relationship with a nonbiological co-parent.236  In many cases 
children’s needs and interests coincide with their parents’ constitutional liberty interests 
                                                 
235 See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (involving a custody and visitation dispute between a 
traditional “surrogate mother” (genetic and gestational) and intended father (genetic) decided based on a 
“best interests” standard). 
 
236 Relationship preservation for children informs notions like “psychological parent,” V.C. v. M.L.B., 748 
A.2d 549, 550-52 (N.J. 2000): 
At the heart of the psychological parent cases is a recognition that children have a strong 
interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love and provide for them.   
That interest, for constitutional as well as social purposes, lies in the emotional bonds that 
develop between family members as a result of shared daily life. . . . [I]n order for a third 
party to be deemed a psychological parent, the legal parent must have fostered the 
formation of the parental relationship between the third party and the child.   By fostered 
is meant that the legal parent ceded over to the third party a measure of parental authority 
and autonomy and granted to that third party rights and duties vis-a-vis the child that the 
third party's status would not otherwise warrant; 
 and “de facto parent,” E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999) (internal citations 
omitted): 
A child may be a member of a nontraditional family in which he is parented by a legal 
parent and a de facto parent. A de facto parent is one who has no biological relation to the 
child, but has participated in the child's life as a member of the child's family. The de 
facto parent resides with the child and, with the consent and encouragement of the legal 
parent, performs a share of caretaking functions at least as great as the legal parent. 
 
See also In re L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005)(finding that Washington state common law 
contains the concept of “de facto” parent to cover nonbiological same-sex coparent); Elisa B. v. 
Superior Court, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 46 (Cal. 2005) (finding that same-sex coparent can be a 
“presumptive parent” with legal parenting status); King v. S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965 (Ind. 
2005)(finding that Indiana law can be construed to award parenting rights and responsibilities to a 
same-sex, nonbiological coparent). 
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in having contact with and influence over their children’s lives and in fostering a 
relationship between the child and another adult with whom the parent decides to co-
parent.237  The child’s best interests are to grow in a stable, loving home with parent(s) he 
or she knows, but this cannot always be.  When a child’s functional co-parents divorce or 
separate, deciding between co-parents by weighing the child’s best interests in staying 
with one or the other, or visiting with either or both, instead of measuring only the 
strength of the parents’ desires and “claims,” makes sense.   
Using a best interests standard and doing that kind of balancing does not make 
sense in the context of ART mix-ups.  Mix-up cases are not disputes between two people 
who acted as co-parents and who have been united in their caring for a child-to-be and/or 
child.   ART mix-up parentage disputes are not between people who have an existing, 
established relationship or bond with the child.   Prospective parents in mix-up cases did 
not choose to have a child within the context of their relationship with one another, did 
not share a life, friends and extended family, do not know one another’s values, nor have 
they agreed on shared values to teach the child.  In ART mix-up cases the children have 
no relationship with the parents whose embryos or gametes were mistakenly “donated.”  
The gamete-donor adults and the children in mix-up cases are the total strangers, and the 
gamete-donors should be declared the legal strangers, if anyone should be.  The situation 
is completely different for children of ART mix-ups than for children in divorce-related 
custody and visitation cases.  In ART mix-ups the child has an existing relationship with 
the gestational mother and her co-parenting partner only. 
Ordinarily, we do not use a best interests standard to decide whether to take a 
child from a parent with whom the child has a relationship to give the child to a complete 
                                                 
237 But see Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69. 
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stranger who wants to parent the child.238   We do not require children to develop 
relationships with strangers, just because that stranger wants to visit with them.  And we 
do not assess whether some stranger can “give” a child more things or opportunities than 
his parents can.  If Bill and Melinda Gates, with all their resources, decide they want to 
parent anybody’s newborn child, for example, the court does not do a best interests 
analysis to see if the child should be given to the Gates.  Absent any clear and convincing 
evidence that the parents are unfit and their rights should be terminated, we do not let 
strangers have children of another parent just because the other person can give them 
more opportunities for wealth, education, and maybe even success.  While this may seem 
an exaggerated analogy, we are in essence giving the Gates the opportunity to get the 
child, if the courts utilize a “best interests” standard of review in mix-up cases to give the 
child to genetic parents who are strangers, particularly mix-up cases involving single 
mothers like Susan Buchweitz.   
Declaring that a stranger to the familial unit is a legal parent and then applying the 
best interest standard violates a principled, constitutionally-based decision not to interfere 
in parent-child relationships in the absence of proof of actual harm to the child.239  The 
familial unit, including the child, in ART mix-up cases (the gestating mother and the co-
                                                 
238 For a state to remove a child from a parent, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the parent 
is “unfit” and that the child has been abused or neglected.   Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 746 (1982); 
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384(b)(3)(g) (1940); Raymond C. O’Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process 
Rights of Children Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209 (1994). 
 
239 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66–67. 
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parent chosen by her who shares in the labor of the child creation and pregnancy) is the 
relationship that the law should protect, not a potential relationship based on genetics.240    
Using a clear and convincing evidence standard before interfering with a parent-
child relationship may appear to be a parent-centered approach, but it is also consistent 
with a child-centered approach.  Employing a higher standard before severing an existing 
parent-child bond preserves a child’s relationship with the adult she believes is her 
parent.  This ought to be true for in utero bonding relationships as well as ex utero 
bonding relationships.  The law has created the high hurdle of clear and convincing 
evidence, in part, because we collectively have determined that it is inconsistent with 
children’s best interests, that is, with children’s needs and health, to forcefully wrench 
them from a loving home to be given to a stranger, no matter what that stranger can offer 
the child or what “seemingly legitimate” claims to the child that the stranger may have.241   
The in utero relationship between the child and gestational mother (and perhaps  
even the child’s in utero relationship to the mother’s coparenting partner) must take 
precedence over genetics in a child-centered analysis.  These first relationships are 
dependent, interpersonal relationships; the latter genetic relationship in an ART mix-up 
case has no interpersonal, dependent qualities.  As Ellen Waldman and others illustrate, 
many genetic fathers form no relational bonds with their genetic progeny if they do not 
have an ongoing relationship with the gestational mother.242  Again, it is the combination 
                                                 
240 See footnote 211 supra. A domestic relationship (cohabiting partnership, civil union or marriage) with 
the gestational mother pre-conception and at conception that does not endure during the pregnancy and 
birth fails to satisfy the labor and relational components this proposed model requires for parental priority. 
 
241 This same rule should be applied in the “switched-at-birth” cases,  see e.g.,  Mays v. Twigg, 543 So. 2d 
241 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) and the adoption revocation cases, see e.g., In Interest of B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 
239 (Iowa 1992) (the Baby Jessica case). 
 
242 Waldman, supra note 71, at 1044 (and authorities cited therein). 
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of labor and interpersonal relationship with the child that creates parenthood under this 
proposed model.     
In summary, genetics-based theories, and often intent-based theories, are parent-
centered in a way that may not coincide at all with a child-centered approach for mix-up 
cases.   A child-centered approach is based on the child’s physical, emotional and 
relational needs.243  Child-centered decisions seek to nurture and support ongoing 
relationships between the child and the parent, or parents with whom the child has an 
existing relationship to enhance stability and security. 244  Priority must be given to those 
prospective parents who have provided the most (and consistent) labor for the benefit, 
physical and emotional health, and development of the child and who have developed 
pre-existing, even in utero, relationships with the child.   
Understanding genetic lineages may be important to children and parents for 
health reasons.  The health information that genetic connections reveal should be made 
available to children and their legal parents by statute, whether or not the genetic 
connection arises from gamete donation or mix-up. The fertility clinic must be statutorily 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
243 Susan Frelich Appleton discusses how adoption law takes a child-centered approach, while ART 
regulation, to date, takes a more parent-centered approach.  Susan Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of 
Reproductive Technology,  2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393 (2004).  She argues, however, that adoption law 
should take a more parent-centered approach akin to the approach typically recognized for consumers of 
ARTs. “[O]ne might conclude that even schemes designed to enhance the autonomy of consumers of ARTs 
accommodate some child-welfare concerns, because parentage laws aim to provide certainty and stability 
for children by dispelling all doubt about who has the responsibility for their care and support.” Id. at 414. 
 
244 Though Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, is clearly a parent-centered decision, it is the “law of the land” 
that our Constitution’s Due Process Clause protects a parent-child relationship from forced third-party 
intervenors in the absence of a showing of unfitness.  Applying an appropriate analysis to determine 
parenthood in ART mistake cases, and then applying Troxel’s rationale, should lead to the stability that 
those children need.  Troxel’s ruling may fail children in non-mix-up cases by possibly severing powerful 
familial bonds with grandparents or others who have raised them, but that is because it is a parent-centered 
approach.  The Troxel ruling does benefit the children of ART mix-ups when used in conjunction with a 
labor-based theory of parenthood. 
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mandated to collect the relevant information before any ART procedure and to convey 
this information to legal parents of children of ART mix-ups, while maintaining complete 
confidentiality of the parties.   Until the child reaches an age where he or she 
independently inquires about his or her genetic lineage, no names or addresses, or 
information about the genetic “relatives” should be available to the gestating couple and 
child or to anonymous, known, or mistaken gamete or embryo donors.   Statutes can 
require fertility clinics to gather this identifying information, seal it, and deposit it with a 
court or governmental registry.  The sealed records may only be opened upon petition of 
the child to a court, when the child is of an age to make that request.  The court’s sole 
role in that case would be to determine whether the child is truly making the request, and 
if the court so determines, the court would be mandated to allow the child access to the 
record.   Adults who believe they were the genetic donors to a particular child would 
have no statutory, common law or equitable right to open the sealed records.   
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
   
 
 As a society we could do as we have been doing so far, that is, leave all parties to 
ART mix-ups to the whims and vagaries of different judges’ analyses of parenthood and 
interpretations of statutes never designed to address mix-ups.  This disastrous approach 
resembles an “assumption of the risk” roll of the dice.  Prospective parents, by engaging 
in reproductive technologies, assume the parentage risks of clinic mix-ups and the risks 
of the ways judges will resolve contested parentage issues.  Personally, I would only 
leave the prospective parents in this posture if I intended to punish them for using 
reproductive technologies.   Leaving hopeful parents-to-be to the whims of various 
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courts’ interpretations of these issues of first impression, whatever analyses they may 
choose, is a very unjust and painful method of dealing with an already horrific situation.  
While any state court or legislature may be able to decide to punish prospective parents 
for using ARTs to remedy their infertility,245 I see no evidence that they are trying to do 
so.246   If society approves of ART use, we have a duty not to leave potential parents in an 
“assumption of the risk” stance with respect to the laws of parenthood in mix-up cases.  
ART mix-ups will not go away.  However these dilemmas end up being resolved, people 
will be left in pain.  We probably cannot prevent that pain, absent a total ban on ARTs, 
which would create a different kind of pain to many, many more people.  Since we 
cannot prevent ART mix-ups from ever occurring again, we can prevent the uncertainty 
and unpredictability of the law, which at this time compounds the prospective parents’ 
problems.  
 This Article recommends a labor-based, relational, child-centered approach to 
establishing parenthood in ART mix-up cases.  A labor-based approach seeks to reward 
potential parents’ efforts in creating and caring for a child by prioritizing as legal parents 
those adults who make the most significant labor contribution to the child’s creation and 
birth.  The gestational mother and her chosen co-parenting partner always get first 
priority under this model, so long as they want to parent the child. Under this proposed 
approach, the answer to parentage disputes in mix-up cases would be clear and non-
debatable from the start.  The combination of the labor contribution and the already 
                                                 
245 But see Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).  The United States Supreme Court has 
not decided whether the liberty to procreate incorporates the liberty to use ARTs to procreate. 
 
246 Certainly in the last decade, jurisdictions and courts that loudly disapprove of commercial surrogacy, or 
reproductive cloning, or pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, or embryonic stem cell research do not also 
loudly indicate disapproval of the use of IVF processes for reproductive purposes.   And no court or 
jurisdiction that I have found has sought to punish users of these technologies through criminal or other 
sanctions. 
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established relationship of an in utero bond make the gestational mother the most 
appropriate person to have parentage priority in mix-up cases.  By offering the gestational 
mother parentage priority based on desert, the proposed approach unseats the sex-based 
biases of a genetic-based approach for defining parenthood in ART mix-up cases.  Should 
the gestational mother decide she does not want to parent the child, this Article suggests a 
method and priority list for alternative legal parents.   
In this recommended approach for resolving ART mix-up disputes, parentage 
following the priority list and rights-relinquishment rules becomes legal without adoption 
or court action.  The suggested model avoids any third-party intervention by genetic or 
intending prospective parents, while preserving the child’s interests in stability and 
existing relationships.  Third-party interventions inevitably create heart-wrenching 
custody and visitation disputes.  This proposal attempts to avoid that outcome.  At the 
same time, in the interests of the children of ART mix-ups, clinics are mandated both to 
maintain absolute confidentiality about the names and identities of the parties to the mix-
up and to give gestational co-parents access to all genetic information relevant to their 
child’s well-being.   When the children of ART mix-ups become mature enough to 
inquire about their genetic forbearers, and if they so request, the statute should provide 
them a right of access to that information by merely petitioning a court.  The proposed 
statutory amendments should also mandate that all prospective parents who engage in 
ARTs be clearly informed about the priority rules relating to parentage determinations in 
cases of ART mix-ups at the time of the initial commitment to engage in the ART 
process, and before each new gamete removal, donation, storage or implantation. 
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In truth, it is difficult enough for two loving adults to parent a child.  Adding a 
forced relationship with another person or couple, with whom the parents are now tied 
only because a clinic mixed-up their gametes, only makes things more difficult for the 
parents and the child.  The cumulative stress, strain, and instability to the family structure 
will undermine the child’s best interests.   Any statute designed to remedy problems 
caused by ART mix-ups must be child-centered, putting the child’s needs for stable, 
existing relationships before the prospective parents’ inconsistent needs.   
Fertility clinics and health care providers can use their best skills and procedures 
to avoid ART embryo or gamete mix-ups.  Nonetheless, there will always be errors 
resulting in the rare mix-ups, even though in each individual case the mix-up may have 
been avoidable.  To err is human.  Therefore, if we cannot completely avoid the 
inevitable human errors of using reproductive technologies to create children, as a society 
we must work even harder to avoid the compounded pain to the parties caused by 
uncertain, oppressive, and sex-biased laws.   Though ARTs occasionally fail us by falling 
prey to human error in their design or implementation, the law’s design and 
implementation can be sufficiently well-reasoned, informed by scholarly commentary, 
and collaboratively developed to avoid aggravating these techno-human calamities.   
Unlike the inevitable human errors in the use of technology, the errors of drafting sex-
biased and unpredictable laws to address problems of ART mix-ups are not inevitable.   
This last statement should not be misunderstood to imply that lawmakers, lawyers, and 
legal scholars are superhuman or infallible.  If nothing else, this Article illustrates how 
badly the legal profession and legislatures have erred to date in resolving parentage 
disputes in cases of ART mix-ups.  Legal mistakes, whether court decisions or statute 
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drafting, are reparable in ways that ART mix-ups are not.  Thankfully, scholars continue 
to work in many disciplines to provide courts and legislators with the knowledge and 
insights they need to construct a clear, comprehensive, and just statute or policy that 
resolves parentage disputes in this currently unaddressed area of ART mix-ups. This 
Article is my humble contribution to this effort and a call to action.   
